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Abstract
We consider optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design in the interdimensional setting,
where one dimension is the ‘value’ of the buyer, and the other is a ‘type’ that captures some
auxiliary information. A prototypical example of this is the FedEx Problem, for which Fiat
et al. [2016] characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent. Another example of this is
when the type encodes the buyer’s budget [DW17]. The question we address is how far can such
characterizations go? In particular, we consider the setting of single-minded agents. A seller
has heterogenous items. A buyer has a valuation v for a specific subset of items S, and obtains
value v if and only if he gets all the items in S (and potentially some others too).
We show the following results.
1. Deterministic mechanisms (i.e. posted prices) are optimal for distributions that satisfy the
“declining marginal revenue” (DMR) property. In this case we give an explicit construction
of the optimal mechanism.
2. Without the DMR assumption, the result depends on the structure of the minimal directed
acyclic graph (DAG) representing the partial order among types. When the DAG has out-
degree at most 1, we characterize the optimal mechanism a` la FedEx; this can be thought
of as a generalization of the FedEx characterization since FedEx corresponds to a DAG
that is a line.
3. Surprisingly, without the DMR assumption and when the DAG has at least one node with
an out-degree of at least 2, then we show that there is no hope of such a characterization.
The minimal such example happens on a DAG with 3 types. We show that in this case
the menu complexity is unbounded in that for any M , there exist distributions over (v, S)
pairs such that the menu complexity of the optimal mechanism is at least M .
4. For the case of 3 types, we also show that for all distributions there exists an optimal
mechanism of finite menu complexity. This is in contrast to the case where you have 2
heterogenous items with additive utilities for which the menu complexity could be un-
countably infinite [MV07; DDT15].
In addition, we prove that optimal mechanisms for Multi-Unit Pricing (without a DMR as-
sumption) can have unbounded menu complexity as well, and we further propose an extension
where the menu complexity of optimal mechanisms can be countably infinite, but not uncount-
ably infinite.
Taken together, these results establish that optimal mechanisms in interdimensional settings
are both surprisingly richer than single-dimensional settings, yet also vastly more structured
than multi-dimensional settings.
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1 Introduction
Consider the problem of selling multiple items to a unit-demand buyer. The fundamental problem
underlying much of mechanism design asks how the seller should maximize their revenue. If the
items are identical, then the setting is considered single-dimensional. In this case, seminal work
of Myerson [1981] completely resolves this question with an exact characterization of the optimal
mechanism. The optimal mechanism is a simple take-it-or-leave-it price, and the fact that there
are multiple items versus just one is irrelevant. In contrast, if the items are heterogenous, then the
setting is multi-dimensional and, unlike the single-dimensional setting, optimal mechanisms are no
longer tractable in any sense: [Manelli and Vincent, 2007; Briest et al., 2015; Hart and Nisan, 2013;
Hart and Reny, 2012; Daskalakis et al., 2013, 2015].
Very recently, Fiat et al. [2016] identify a fascinating middle-ground. Imagine that the items
are neither identical nor heterogeneous, but are instead varying qualities of the same item. To have
an example in mind, imagine that you’re shipping a package and the items are one-day, two-day, or
three-day shipping. You obtain some value v for having your package shipped, but only if it arrives
by your deadline (which is one, two, or three days from now). We can think of the input as being
a (correlated) two-dimensional distribution over (value, deadline) pairs.
The FedEx Problem is a special case of single-minded valuations: a buyer has a valuation v for a
specific subset of items S, and obtains value v if he gets any superset of S, and 0 otherwise. To have
an example in mind, imagine that a company offers internet, phone service, and cable TV. You have
a value, v, and are interested in getting internet service. So you value options such as exclusively
internet service, internet/phone service, or internet/cable, and so on, at v. For any option that
does not include internet you get a value of zero (so we again think of the input distribution as a
two-dimensional distribution over (value, interest) pairs).
An alternative perspective to single-minded valuations is that there is a partial order on the set
of possible interests a buyer may have. The partial order is just the one induced by set inclusion.
The FedEx problem has totally-ordered items: one-day shipping is at least as good as two-day
shipping is at least as good as three-day shipping, and every buyer agrees. In fact, any partial
order can be induced from set inclusion, so the two settings are equivalent (see Observation 2 in
Appendix G). It turns out that the partial order view is more useful from a mechanism design
perspective, therefore we will use that view for the rest of the paper.
The following problem can also be interpreted as a partially-ordered setting: Suppose that each
buyer has a publicly visible attribute which the seller can use to price discriminate. E.g., the buyer
could be a student, a senior, or general-admission. Or, the buyer could be a “prime member” or a
“non-prime member.” However, buyers with certain attributes can disguise themselves as having
other attributes, given by a partial order. For example, a prime member could disguise as a non-
prime member, but not vice-versa. Then if item i is a movie ticket redeemable by anyone who can
disguise themselves as having attribute i, the items are partially-ordered.
1.1 Main Results
Fiat et al. [2016] give a characterization of an optimal mechanism for the FedEx problem, and our
goal is to understand the generalizability of this characterization, in particular to the partially or-
dered setting. Towards this, we first describe the FedEx characterization and what a generalization
could look like. A deterministic mechanism sets a posted price pi for each shipping option, and the
buyer picks the option he prefers (if any). Clearly, it makes sense for the prices to be non-increasing
in i-day shipping. The FedEx solution is recursive: start with the price on day 1 (as a variable),
and constrain the price on day 2 to be weakly lower, and so on. When the distributions satisfy the
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Declining Marginal Revenue (DMR)1 property, this strategy actually results in deterministic prices
that are optimal. Without any distributional assumption, one might have to resort to lotteries:
the buyer gets the item only with some probability. The first day price is still deterministic, but
for the second day, the mechanism offers a lottery such that the expected price for full service is
weakly lower. It turns out that we only need to randomize between two options. Recursively, every
option on day i may split into two options on day i+ 1, so we might have at most 2m−1 options on
day m, and 2m− 1 options overall (and examples exist where 2m− 1 options are necessary [Saxena
et al., 2018]).
So our starting point is a hope that similar recursive ideas can characterize optimal auctions
beyond the totally-ordered FedEx setting. Some terminology is useful here to understand precisely
what this might mean. We use the directed acyclic graph (DAG) representation of a partial order:
an edge from i to j implies j is preferred over i. The DAG is minimal : if (i, j) and (j, k) are edges
then (i, k) is not an edge. The DAG for the FedEx problem goes right to left, i.e., it has edges
(i + 1, i) for i from 1 to m − 1. A recursive approach for a DAG would look like this: start with
a sink, set a deterministic price, and use this to constrain the prices (either deterministically or in
expectation, based on the distributional assumption) for its predecessors and so on. The goal of
this paper is to understand Will something like this work for partially-ordered items?
DMR: Under the DMR assumption, this strategy for pricing works in any DAG (Theorem 4 in
Appendix C). We start from the sink nodes and recursively constrain the price of a node to be
at most the minimum among the prices of all its successors. Our proof that this procedure works
employs LP duality, and a significantly more involved procedure to set appropriate dual variables
than in [FGKK16]. The fact that optimal mechanisms are deterministic subject to DMR matches
prior work for totally-ordered settings [Che and Gale 2000; FGKK16; DW17; DHP17].
Out-degree 1: The FedEx strategy still works when the minimal DAG has out-degree at most 1,
without any distributional assumptions (Theorem 5 in Appendix D). Compared to the DMR case,
we now have to deal with lotteries but when we process a node, there is exactly one successor that
constrains the lotteries for this node, in exactly the same way as in FedEx.
3 node DAG: The minimal example where the out-degree is 2 is a three-node DAG with nodes
A,B, and C, and edges (C,A) and (C,B). One might hope that the following recursive strategy
would work (after all, the graph is still a DAG, and should be amenable to recursive arguments):
set prices deterministically for A and B and use the minimum of the two to constrain the expected
price for C. Note that if there were no item B, this would match precisely the FedEx solution.
It turns out that this idea fails horribly, for the following (very high-level) reason. With just two
items (C and A), the price of A transparently constrains what prices we can set for C (the expected
price for C must be lower). So when optimizing the price of A, we can take this into account. With
three items, it’s no longer clear how the price of A constrains the price of C. Certainly, the expected
price for C must be lower, but perhaps a stronger constraint is already implied by the price of B.
Therefore, one cannot separately optimize the price of A without knowing the price of B.
Indeed, this intuition actually manifests into a lower bound: it is not only challenging to jointly
optimize the prices of A,B together, but the optimum may no longer be deterministic at all!
Specifically, for any integer M , there exist value distributions for this 3-node DAG for which the
1A one-dimensional distribution F satisfies Declining Marginal Revenues if v(1 − F (v)) is concave. See Deva-
nur et al. [2017] for examples and more discussion. For example, uniform distributions are DMR, along with any
distribution of bounded support and monotone non-decreasing density.
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Known Menu Complexity Results for Optimal Mechanisms with One Buyer
One Item FedEx Single-Minded, 3 Items Multi-Unit Coordinated, 3 Items Additive
Det. under DMR N/A X 3 X 7 N/A
Lower Bound 1 2m − 1 unbounded unbounded countably infinite uncountable
Upper Bound 1 2m − 1 finite — countably infinite uncountable
Bold results are from this paper.
unique optimal mechanism presents M different lotteries to the buyer (Theorem 1). Essentially,
there is no hope for a FedEx style solution even for this minimal case. We focus the technical
presentation of our paper on this result.
Finiteness of menu complexity: The use of menu complexity lower bounds to ascertain com-
plexity of mechanisms is not new: Manelli and Vincent [2007]; Daskalakis et al. [2015] show that the
optimal mechanism for the multi-dimensional setting might have uncountable menu complexity—
this holds even for just two items with additive valuations, and even when the item values are drawn
independently from absolutely bounded distributions. This dichotomy serves as one fundamental
difference between single-dimensional and multi-dimensional settings.
Within the context of these results, we ask if we can get an infinite (uncountable or countable)
menu complexity for the partially-ordered setting as well. A natural strategy is to take the limit
of our construction as the number of randomizations goes to infinity. Somewhat surprisingly, the
example then collapses and has a deterministic price as optimal. We show that this is no coincidence:
that the menu complexity for the three item case is always finite (Theorem 2).
Summary: The main technical takeaway from our results is a thorough understanding of optimal
mechanisms in interdimensional settings beyond FedEx through broadly applicable tools. Our the-
orem statements use the language of menu complexity, but only to distinguish among mechanisms
with bounded, unbounded, or infinite menu complexity. The main conceptual takeaway is that op-
timal auctions for single-minded valuations lie in a space of their own: significantly more complex
than optimal single-dimensional auctions, or even optimal auctions for totally-ordered valuations,
yet more structured than optimal multi-dimensional auctions.
1.2 Additional results
We postpone all details about our proofs to the technical sections, but highlight one result of
independent interest that we develop en route. Our problem can be phrased as a continuous linear
program, and all of our proofs require reasoning about the dual. In particular, developing our lower
bound construction (instances with unbounded menu complexity) consists of two parts: First, we
construct a candidate dual λ for which a primal exists satisfying complementary slackness, and
for which every primal satisfying complementary slackness has menu complexity ≥ M . Second,
we prove that there exists a distribution for which λ is a feasible dual (and combining these two
claims means that every optimal mechanism for this input has menu complexity ≥M). Analyzing
λ through complementary slackness is technically interesting, and captures all of the insight one
would hope to gain from the construction. Reverse engineering an instance for which λ is feasible,
however, is technically challenging yet unilluminating. On this front, we prove a “Master Theorem,”
stating essentially that every candidate dual is feasible for some input distribution (Theorem 9).
This allows the user (of the theorem) to reason exclusively about primals and duals, letting the
Master Theorem map the candidate pair back to an instance for which they are feasible. In some
sense, the Master Theorem formally separates the insightful analysis from the tedious parts.
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Of course, one should not expect this theorem to hold in general multi-dimensional settings
(in particular, one key property that enables our Master Theorem is a “payment identity,” which
general multi-dimensional settings notoriously lack—this is a further example of how our setting lies
in-between single- and multi-dimensional), but the Master Theorem is quite generally applicable
for problems in this intermediate range. In addition, because the Master Theorem takes care of
guaranteeing that distributions corresponding to some dual will exist, this result also emphasizes
the strength of reasoning about duals in similar settings.
Finally, beyond our main results, we prove two additional results using the same tools. First,
we apply our lower bound techniques to show that the menu complexity of the Multi-Unit Pricing
problem [DHP17] is also unbounded (Theorem 12 in Appendix I). Multi-Unit Pricing is also a
totally-ordered setting, where the items correspond to copies of a good (item one is one copy, item
two is two copies, item three is three copies). The difference from FedEx is that if the buyer is
interested in two copies but gets one, they get half their value (versus zero). Second, we propose
a generalization beyond totally-ordered settings which we call coordinated valuations, and again
characterize the menu complexity of optimal mechanisms for one instance of three items (which
can be countably infinite, but not uncountable, see Appendix J).
1.3 Related Work
Single-minded valuations are a well-known model (e.g. [Lehmann et al., 2002]). Most work in this
model pertains to welfare maximization in more complex settings, such as combinatorial auctions.
Other work assumes that the buyer’s interest is publicly known; in this case, the buyer is single-
parameter, and a single-buyer revenue maximization problem reduces to Myerson.
The most related line of works has already mostly been discussed. The FedEx Problem considers
totally-ordered items (in our language), as does Multi-Unit Pricing and Budgets [Che and Gale,
2000; Fiat et al., 2016; Devanur et al., 2017; Devanur and Weinberg, 2017]. The present paper is
the first to consider partially-ordered items. In terms of techniques, we indeed draw on tools from
prior work. All three prior works employ some form of duality. Our approach is most similar to
that of Devanur and Weinberg [2017] in that (1) both are the only works to use the analysis from
[CDW16] to characterize optimal mechanisms rather than obtain approximations, and (2) we also
perform “dual operations” rather than search for a closed form. However, as the single-minded
setting is much more complicated, we extend the techniques to handle this setting.
Also related is a long line of work which aims to characterize optimal mechanisms beyond
single-dimensional settings. Owing to the inherent complexity of mechanism design for hetero-
geneous items, results on this front necessarily consider restricted settings [Laffont et al., 1987;
Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias, 2014; McAfee and McMillan, 1988; Daskalakis et al., 2013, 2015;
Haghpanah and Hartline, 2015; Malakhov and Vohra, 2009]. From this set, the most related
are Haghpanah and Hartline [2015]; Malakhov and Vohra [2009], who also considered settings where
all consumers prefer (e.g.) item a to item b, but there are no substantial technical connections.
There is also a quickly growing body of work regarding the menu complexity of multi-item
auctions. Much of this work focuses on settings with heterogeneous items [Briest et al., 2015; Hart
and Nisan, 2013; Babaioff et al., 2017; Wang and Tang, 2014; Daskalakis et al., 2015; Gonczarowski,
2018]. Very recent work of [SSW18] considers the menu complexity of approximately optimal mech-
anisms for the FedEx Problem (for which [FGKK16] already characterized the menu complexity
of exactly optimal mechanisms). On this front, our work places partially-ordered items (where the
menu complexity is finite but unbounded) distinctly between totally-ordered items (where the menu
complexity is bounded) [FGKK16], and heterogeneous items (uncountable) [DDT15]. Previously,
no settings with this property were known.
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1.4 Roadmap
Our paper contains four main results, although we view the primary contributions as (3) and (4):
1. In Appendix C, we prove Theorem 4, which explicitly constructs a deterministic optimal
auction for partially-ordered items when all marginals are DMR.
2. In Appendix D, we prove Theorem 5, which extends the recursive FedEx algorithm for totally-
ordered items to partially-ordered items when minimal DAGs with outdegree at most one.
3. We focus our technical presentation on the ideas necessary for Theorem 1, which establishes
that any partially-ordered instance for which some node in the minimal DAG has outdegree
at least two, the menu complexity of the optimal mechanism may be unbounded. In Section 2
we provide the minimal preliminaries to understand the main ideas behind our proof of this
result (full preliminaries in Appendix A). In Section 3 we overview the key duality aspects.
In Section 4 we give a brief overview of the proof of Theorem 1. The full proof is in appendix E.
4. Finally, we also establish that the menu complexity of optimal mechanisms for this minimal
3-item instance is always finite. The main ideas appear in Section 4, and a full proof of
Theorem 2 appears in Appendix F.
Outside of our main results, Appendix H presents our “Master Theorem” (Theorem 9), which
is of independent interest for future work on mechanism design with totally- or partially-ordered
items. In Appendix I and Appendix J we display the applicability of our techniques for related
settings such as Multi-Unit Pricing (Theorem 12) and coordinated values (Theorems 14, 16, 17),
respectively. Section 5 presents our conclusions and discusses future work.
2 Preliminaries
In the interest of presentation, we’ll provide the minimum preliminaries here for the reader to
understand the key ideas. In Appendix A, we provide full preliminaries, including additional
intuition, and covering prior work (such as [FGKK16; DW17]). Many of the facts we will use are
stated here without proof (proofs are given in Appendix A).
2.1 A Minimal Instance
We focus on the three-item case with items G = {A,B,C} where A  C and B  C, but A 6 B
and B 6 A. That is, if a buyer is interested in item C, they are content with A or B. If they are
interested in A, they are content only with A (ditto for B). There is a single buyer with a (value,
interest) pair (v,G), who receives value v if they are awarded an item  G (that is, G′  G or
G′ = G). This is the minimal non-trivial example of a partially-ordered setting. A menu-complexity
lower bound for this example applies to any partially-ordered setting that contains an item G with
at least two incomparable items that dominate G (which includes every single-minded valuation
setting with at least 3 items).
An instance of the problem consists of a joint probability distribution over [0, H]×G, where H
is the maximum possible value of any bidder for any item.2 We will use f to denote the density of
this joint distribution, with fG(v) denoting the density at (v,G). We will also use FG(v) to denote∫ v
0 fG(w)dw, and qG to denote the probability that the bidder’s interest is G.
2Note that the multi-dimensional instances with uncountable menu complexity are also supported on a compact
set: [0, H]2. So our results are not merely a product of compactness.
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We’ll consider (w.l.o.g.) direct truthful mechanisms, where the bidder reports a (value, interest)
pair and is awarded a (possibly randomized) item. Further, as observed in Fiat et al. [2016], it is
without loss of generality to only consider mechanisms that award bidders their declared item of
interest with probability in [0, 1], and all other items with probability 0.3 For a direct mechanism,
we’ll define aG(v) to be the probability that item G is awarded to a bidder who reports (v,G).
Our goal is to find the revenue-optimal allocation rule—aG(v) defined for all G ∈ G, v ∈ [0, H] with
payment determined by the allocation rule—such that the mechanism is incentive-compatible. The
menu complexity of a direct mechanism refers to the number of distinct pairs (G, q) such that there
exists a v with aG(v) = q.
2.2 Incentive Compatibility, Revenue Curves, and Ironing
As observed in [FGKK16], it is without loss of generality to only consider mechanisms that award
bidders their declared item of interest with probability in [0, 1], and all other items with probability
0. Also observed in [FGKK16] is that Myerson’s payment identity holds in this setting as well,
and any truthful mechanism must satisfy pG(v) = vaG(v) −
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw (this also implies that
the bidder’s utility when truthfully reporting (v,G) is uG(v) =
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw). This allows us to
drop the payment variables, and follow Myerson’s analysis. Fiat et al. observe that many of the
truthfulness constraints are redundant, and in fact it suffices to only make sure that when the
bidder has (value, interest) pair (v,G) they:
• Prefer to tell the truth rather than report any other (v′, G). This is accomplished by con-
straining aG(·) to be monotone non-decreasing (exactly as in the single-item setting).
• Prefer to tell the truth rather than report any other (v,G′ ∈ N+(G)). By N+(G), we mean
all items G′ such that G′  G, but there does not exist a G′′ with G′  G′′  G. This is
accomplished by constraining
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw ≥
∫ v
0 aG′(w)dw (as the LHS denotes the utility
of the buyer for reporting (v,G) and the RHS denotes the utility of the buyer for reporting
(v,G′)). Note that this is equivalent to saying that the area under G’s allocation curve should
be at least as large at every v as the area under G′’s allocation curve.
All of these constraints together imply that (v,G) also does not prefer to report any other (v′, G′).4
We conclude this section with some standard definitions and observations.
Definition 1 (Revenue Curve). The revenue curve for an item G with CDF FG is a function RG
that maps a value v to the revenue obtained by posting a price of v, for a single item, when buyer
values are drawn from the distribution FG. Formally, RG(v) := v · [1− FG(v)] · qG. We say that a
revenue curve is feasible if there exists a distribution that induces it. The monopoly reserve price
rG of the revenue curve is rG ∈ arg maxpRG(p).
Definition 2 (Virtual Value). Myerson’s virtual valuation function ϕG(·) is defined so that ϕG(v) :=
v − 1−FG(v)fG(v) . Observe that R′G(v) = 1− FG(v)− vfG(v) = −ϕG(v)fG(v). When clear from context
we will omit the subindex G.
3To see this, observe that the bidder is just as happy to get nothing instead of an item that doesn’t dominate
their interest. See also that they are just as happy to get their interest item instead of any item that dominates it.
It will also make this option no more attractive to any bidder considering misreporting. So starting from a truthful
mechanism, modifying it to only award the item of declared interest or nothing cannot possibly violate truthfulness.
Note also that this modification maintains optimality, but could impact the menu complexity up to a factor of #
items. As we only consider distinctions between bounded, unbounded, and infinite, this is still w.l.o.g.
4 For example, if (v,G) prefers truthful reporting to reporting (v,G′) where G′  G, and (v,G′) prefers truthful
reporting to reporting (v′, G′), then since (v,G) gets the same utility for reporting (v,G′) as type (v,G′) does for
truthfully reporting, (v,G) prefers truthful reporting to reporting (v′, G′).
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Definition 3 (DMR). We say that a marginal distribution of values FG satisfies declining marginal
revenues (DMR) if RG(v) is concave, or equivalently, if ϕG(v)fG(v) is monotone non-decreasing.
When the marginal distributions do not all satisfy the DMR assumption, we instead need to
iron the distribution, an analogue to Myersonian ironing.
Definition 4 (Ironing). The ironed revenue curve denoted Rˆ(·) for a revenue curve R(·) is the least
concave upper bound on the revenue curve R(·).5 A point v is ironed if Rˆ(v) 6= R(v). We say that
[a, b] is an ironed interval if Rˆ(a) = R(a), Rˆ(b) = R(b), and Rˆ(v) 6= R(v) for all v ∈ (a, b), where if
v ∈ (a, b), then a and b are the lower and upper endpoints of the ironed interval, respectively.
An ironed revenue curve is depicted in Figure 1. By the definition of concavity, if z is ironed,
then Rˆ(z) = βR(a) + (1 − β)R(b) where z ∈ (a, b), βa + (1 − β)b = z, and a, b are unironed.
Importantly, observe that setting price z to a consumer drawn from FG yields revenue R(z) < Rˆ(z).
Yet, if we set price a with probability β and b with probability (1 − β), we will get revenue
βR(a) + (1− β)R(b) = Rˆ(z). One can check that this is precisely the allocation and payment
a(v) =

0 v < a
β v ∈ [a, b)
1 v ≥ b
and p(v) =

0 v < a
βa v ∈ [a, b)
βa+ (1− β)b v ≥ b
.
Figure 1: For some implicit distribution F , the revenue curve R(v) = v · [1− F (v)] is depicted, as
is the ironed revenue curve, or the revenue curve’s least concave upper bound.
3 Duality
In this section, we briefly overview the bare minimum duality preliminaries required. Full duality
preliminaries are provided in Appendix A.3-A.5.
3.1 Dual Terminology.
In this section, we introduce pictorial representations (Figures 2 and 3) of key aspects of a dual
solution and define terminology relevant to the dual.
The primal variables are aG(v) for all G ∈ G, v ∈ [0, H]. Recall that we use uG(v) =
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw
to refer to the utility of (v,G). The dual variables are λG(v), αG,G′(v) for all G,G
′ ∈ G, and
v ∈ [0, H]. We first explain the role of these dual variables, and then describe the Lagrangian
relaxation obtained using these dual variables.
5We emphasize that this work irons the revenue curve with values on the x-axis. Classical one-dimensional ironing
(to yield Myersonian ironed virtual values) is done on the revenue curve with quantiles on the x-axis.
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Figure 2: A pictorial interpretation of virtual values fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) and the dual variable λG(v),
in addition to the concepts of endpoints of the zero region, ironing, an ironed interval, and the
allocation in response.
Dual Variable λ. The λ dual variables correspond to incentive constraints between types of the
same interest but different value. This dual controls ironing, as explained below. This really does
correspond to ironing in the classical Myerson sense, only in value space.
An oval (as depicted in Figure 2) represents an ironed interval, a region where the dual variable
λG(·) is non-zero.
• (Ironing) We say a type (v,G) is ironed, or that v is ironed in item G, if λG(v) > 0.
• (Ironed Intervals) For any type (x,G), the ironed interval containing x in G is defined by the
bottom end point xG = sup{v ≤ x | λG(v) = 0} and the top end point x¯G = inf{v ≥ x |
λG(v) = 0}. Then for all v ∈ (xG, x¯G), type (v,G) is ironed, v¯G = x¯G, and vG = xG.
As we will see later, dual best response (condition (4)) requires that if λG(v) > 0 then a
′
G(v) = 0.
In other words, the allocation rule aG must be constant over ironed intervals. For any value x, an
optimal allocation must satisfy that aG(x) = aG(xG).
Dual Variable α. The α dual variables correspond to incentive constraints between types of the
same value but different interest.
Figure 3: A pictorial representation of the dual variable α, in addition to the concepts of flow,
preferable items, and equally preferable items. Flow is assumed to be coming from item C.
In Figure 3, a horizontal arrow into item A (or B) at v indicates that αC,A(v) (or αC,B(v)) is
non-zero. We write the following statements for G ∈ {A,B}.
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• (Flow) We will call the value of αG′,G(v) the “flow into (v,G)” or the “flow into G at v.”
When we focus on the minimal partial-order example, we infer that flow into A or B comes
from C in our figure.
Dual best response (condition (5)) requires that forG ∈ {A,B}, if αC,G(v) > 0 then
∫ v
0 aG(x)dx =∫ v
0 aC(x)dx, or equivalently, uG(v) = uC(v): a type with value v should have the same utility in C
and G. Sending flow across interests forces the corresponding utilities to be the same.
Virtual Values. We will define a new variable, Φλ,α(v) for all v ∈ [0, H], and we will call the
product f(v)Φλ,α(v) the virtual value.6 Once again, this is a generalization of Myerson’s virtual
value function to this more general setting.
Figure 2 has a vertical axis ranging over values from 0 (at the bottom) to H (at the top), with
a label of the item of focus G at the top. The point on the axis for any v represents the virtual
value fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v).
Of particular interest to us is the region where the virtual value is 0 because this is the region
(and the only region) for which a primal satisfying complementary slackness can have a randomized
allocation. This is an interval if (fGΦ
λ,α
G )(·) is monotone in v (our solution ensures it is; details in
Appendix A.5).
• (Endpoints of Zero Region) We define the bottom end point of the zero virtual value region in
G by rG = inf{v | fG(v)Φλ,αG (v) ≥ 0} and the top end point r¯G = sup{v | fG(v)Φλ,αG (v) ≤ 0}.
In Figure 2 the horizontal black lines and signs indicate where the virtual values shift from positive
sign to zero, rG, and from zero to negative sign, rG. Primal best response requires the allocation
to satisfy aG(v) = 0 for v ≤ rG (condition (2)) and aG(v) = 1 for v ≥ rG (condition (3)).
3.2 The Lagrangian Dual.
The quality of a primal solution is measured by how well it solves the following Lagrangian relax-
ation induced by (λ, α). The quality of a dual solution is measured by the value of its induced
Lagrangian relaxation. A dual is better if the value of its induced Lagrangian relaxation is smaller.
Variables: aG(v) ∀G ∈ G, v ∈ [0, H]
Maximize
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v) · aG(v) · Φλ,αG (v)dv
subject to aG(v) ∈ [0, 1]
where ϕG(v) = v − 1− FG(v)
fG(v)
and where Φλ,αG (v)
:= ϕG(v) +
1
fG(v)
−λ′G(v) + ∑
G′∈N+(G)
∫ H
v
αG,G′(w)dw −
∑
G′:G∈N+(G′)
∫ H
v
αG′,G(w)dw
 . (1)
Before continuing, lets parse the Lagrangian relaxation. The only remaining constraints are that
aG(v) ∈ [0, 1], and the objective is a linear function of these variables. This immediately implies
6 Whether we refer to Φ as the virtual value or Φf reflects whether we iron in the quantile space or the value
space.
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that the solution to this LP relaxation will set aG(v) = 1 whenever Φ
λ,α
G (v) > 0, and aG(v) = 0
whenever Φλ,αG (v) < 0. This implies that if there is any randomization, i.e., aG(v) ∈ (0, 1) then it
must be that Φλ,αG (v) = 0. The details of the definition of Φ are not so important here. (However,
note that in the definition of Φ, the term λ′ refers to the derivative of λ.)
3.3 Complementary Slackness.
Under strong duality, a (primal, dual) pair is optimal if and only if the primal and dual satisfy
complementary slackness. In addition, if a dual (λ, α) is optimal, i.e. satisfies complementary
slackness with some primal, then any primal is optimal if and only if it satisfies complementary
slackness with (λ, α). Let’s review complementary slackness in our setting. A primal a and dual
(λ, α) satisfy complementary slackness if and only if:7
(Primal best response) Φλ,αG (v) > 0 ⇒ aG(v) = 1 (2)
Φλ,αG (v) < 0 ⇒ aG(v) = 0 (3)
(Dual best response) λG(v) > 0 ⇒ a′G(v) = 0 (4)
αG,G′(v) > 0 ⇒
∫ v
0
aG(x)dx−
∫ v
0
aG′(x)dx = 0 (5)
That is, a primal is a best response to a dual if all (v,G) with positive virtual value are awarded
the item, and all (v,G) with negative virtual value are not. A dual is a best response to a primal
if whenever a dual variable is non-zero, the corresponding local IC constraint is tight. The entire
technical aspect of this paper is using the constraints imposed by complementary slackness in (2-5)
to reason about optimal mechanisms and their menu complexity.
4 Menu Complexity
We provide here the key ideas behind the construction that forms our lower bound and the proof
of our upper bound. Full details are provided in Appendix E and Appendix F respectively.
4.1 Menu Complexity is Unbounded: A Gadget and Candidate Instance
In this section, we provide a gadget that will be used in our menu complexity lower bound, and
successively chain copies of it together to build our full construction. For one instance of our gadget,
we provide a concrete potential dual, and prove that any allocation rule satisfying complementary
slackness with it must have two distinct allocation probabilities. In order for this example to
establish a menu complexity lower bound of two, we must additionally:
• Establish that there exists a distribution F for which our dual is feasible. This is not covered
in this section, and is deferred to our Master Theorem (Theorem 9).
• Establish that there exists an allocation rule which satisfies complementary slackness with
this dual, thereby establishing that the dual is optimal (and any optimal allocation rule must
satisfy complementary slackness with it). This is also not covered in this section, and is
deferred to Appendix F.
7One can interpret these conditions as saying that the primal is an optimal solution to the Lagrangian relaxation,
and the dual is the worst possible Lagrangian relaxation for the primal.
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We begin below with our gadget, then successively chain copies together to establish a menu
complexity lower bound of M for any M > 0. We recall the following facts established in the
previous section:
1. A + in any graphics at (x,G) represents a strictly positive Virtual Value, which implies that
aA(x) = 1 in any allocation rule satisfying CS. A − in any graphics at (x,G) represents a
strictly negative Virtual Value, which implies that aG(x) = 0. (CS2-3)
2. A ← in any graphics into A at x represents flow in. When there is flow into both A and B
at the same point x, this implies that uA(x) = uB(x). (CS5)
3. A point x in the middle of an oval in any graphics represents that x is contained in the interior
of an ironed interval, and implies that a(x) = a(y) where y is the bottom of the oval. (CS4)
4.1.1 Step One: the base gadget and a lower bound of M = 2.
Figure 4: Left: Our first example that requires randomizing on A, containing an ironed interval
[rA, rA] (so aA(x1) = aA(rA)) and flow into both A and B at x1 (so uA(x1) = uB(x1)). Right:
Primal best response dictates a price of x for item B, while A’s allocation is 0 until rA and 1 after
rA. Equal preferability at x1 forces uA(x1) (the red area) equals uB(x1) (the blue area); the ironed
interval [rA, rA] requires aA(·) to be constant in this region, hence we must have aA(rA) ∈ (0, 1).
Our base case example is depicted in Figure 4. We note each feature, and how it ties our hands
with respect to the allocation rule via complementary slackness.
• In item B, there is a single point x < rA for which fB(x)Φλ,αB (x) = 0. That is, rB = rB = x.
Then (CS2) implies that aB(v) = 1 for v > x.
• There is flow into both items A and B at x1 > x. That is, αC,A(x1), αC,B(x1) > 0. (CS5)
implies that A and B must be equally preferable at x1, that is,
∫ x1
0 aA(w)dw =
∫ x1
0 aB(w)dw.
Note that aB(w) > 0 for w ∈ (x, x1], hence
∫ x1
0 aB(w)dw > 0. Then to have
∫ x1
0 aA(w)dw > 0,
because aA(·) is monotone, it must be the case that aA(x1) > 0.
• The point x1 has fA(x1)Φλ,αA (x1) = 0 and is in an ironed interval [rA, rA] where rA < x, that
is, this ironed interval is the entire region of values that have virtual value zero in item A
and it contains both x1 and x. Because x1 is in an ironed interval in A, then the allocation
is constant, so aA(rA) = aA(x1), which we have already established must be positive.
• For whatever value that aA(rA) takes on, because rA < x, to satisfy equal preferability at x1
(again, that
∫ x1
0 aA(w)dw =
∫ x1
0 aB(w)dw), we must have aB(x) > aA(rA)(> 0), resulting in
at least two distinct non-zero probabilities of allocation.
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To complete the example, (1) there is no other flow: for all v 6= x1, αC,A(v) = αC,B(v) = 0, and
(2) item C is unironed everywhere: λC(v) = 0 for all v. This base gadget forces randomization for
the allocation of item A because the utility of x1 must be equal at A and B, but the allocation of
item B must be zero below x, while the allocation of item A must be non-zero.
4.1.2 Step Two: two chains and a lower bound of M = 3.
Our second example (see Figure 5) contains the relevant features from the first example, but extends
it to add an additional constraint: we replace the condition rB = rB = x with an ironed interval
[rB, rB] where rB < rA < rB < rA. We claim that this example requires us to randomize on both
items. Intuitively, this is because we now have two constraints on utilities that must be satisfied,
so two degrees of freedom seems necessary.
• There is flow into both items A and B at x1 ∈ (rB, rA): αC,A(x1), αC,B(x1) > 0. (CS2)
implies that aB(v) = 1 for v > rB, so to satisfy equal preferability, we must have aA(x1) > 0.
• The point x1 has fA(x1)Φλ,αA (x1) = 0 and is in an ironed interval [rA, rA] where rA < rB. As
x1 is in an ironed interval in A, then the allocation is constant, so aA(rA) = aA(x1) > 0.
• There is flow into both items A and B at x2 ∈ (rA, rB): αC,A(x2), αC,B(x2) > 0. Since
aA(x2) > 0—it lies in the ironed interval in A, so aA(x2) = aA(rA)—then to satisfy equal
preferability at x2, we must have aB(x2) > 0.
• The point x2 has fB(x2)Φλ,αB (x2) = 0 and is in an ironed interval [rB, rB] where rB < rA. As
x2 is in an ironed interval in B, then the allocation is constant, so aB(rB) = aB(x2) > 0.
• For whatever value that aB(rB) takes on, because rB < rA, then to satisfy equal preferability
at x2 (that
∫ x2
0 aA(w)dw =
∫ x2
0 aB(w)dw), we must have aA(rA) > aA(rB)(> 0).
• For whatever value that aA(rA) takes on, because rA < rB, then to satisfy equal preferabil-
ity at x1 (
∫ x1
0 aA(w)dw =
∫ x1
0 aB(w)dw), we must have aB(rB) > aA(rA)(> aA(rB) > 0),
resulting in at least three distinct non-zero probabilities of allocation.
Again, (1) there is no other flow: for all v 6= x1, x2, αC,A(v) = αC,B(v) = 0, and (2) item C is
unironed everywhere: λC(v) = 0 for all v.
Observe that in both examples, we reason from where we have one item with positive virtual
value and the other with virtual value zero downward that, in order to satisfy a number of equal
preferability constraints, because ironed intervals force the allocation to be constant, then at every
point, the allocation must be non-zero. Then, we reason upward that, because the ironed intervals
are interleaving between the items and never aligned, the allocation must strictly increase at each
point of interest in order to satisfy equal preferability. This is precisely the reasoning we will use
to construct and prove an arbitrarily large instance and menu.
4.1.3 Step Three: four chains and a lower bound of M = 4.
In this section, we take one more step towards our general construction. The first example presents
our base gadget, and the second example chains two copies together. In this section, we simply
confirm how the gadgets interact as we chain more and more together, bouncing back and forth
from A to B.
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Figure 5: Left: Our second example, which requires randomization on both A and B.
Right: If aA(rA) ≤ aB(rB), then uA(x2) < uB(x2) (the blue region is smaller than the red), which
violates complementary slackness.
Figure 6: Left: An optimal dual for our example distributions, which will require at least 4 distinct
allocation probabilities.
Right: If aA(rA) ≤ aB(rB), then uA(x2) < uB(x2) (the blue region is smaller than the red), which
violates complementary slackness via Fact 2 at x4.
Nonzero allocation probabilities. First, we see that the allocation at every ironed value v such
that Φλ,αG (v) = 0 must be nonzero: aG(v) > 0. The argument holds for each of (x1, A), (x2, B),
(x3, A), and (x4, B). Below we iterate the same argument made in the two previous sections,
skipping some details.
• Note that aB(x1) > 0 by Fact 1, and thus uB(x1) > 0.
• By Fact 2, uA(x1) = uB(x1) > 0. Then aA(x1) > 0.
• By Fact 3, aA(sA) = aA(x1) > 0. This also implies that uA(x2) > 0.
• Now, again by Fact 2, uB(x2) = uA(x2) > 0, so aB(x2) > 0.
• Now, again by Fact 3, aB(x3) = aB(x2) > 0, so uB(x3) > 0.
• Again by Fact 2, uA(x3) = uB(x3) > 0, so aA(x3) > 0.
• By Fact 3, aA(x4) = aA(x3) > 0, so uA(x4) > 0.
• Finally by Fact 2, uB(x4) = uA(x4) > 0.
Essentially, if any of these allocations must be positive, it forces the rest of them, working
downwards, to be positive. And, by Fact 1, aB(x1) = 1, so uB(x1) > 0. Hence the rest of the
implications follow, so the allocation must be nonzero throughout this region.
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Figure 7: Our candidate dual instance: a top chain that spans the entire region of zero virtual
values for both A and B with no gaps between the ironed intervals that comprise the chain. There
is flow into A and B at every point xi in the chain.
Distinct allocation probabilities. Now, given that the allocation must be nonzero at every
point in this range, we argue that it must be distinct at all of the points of interest. Fix some
nonzero aB(rB), and note by Fact 3 that aB(v) = aB(rB) for all v ∈ [rB, sB]. By Fact 1, aG(v) = 0
for v < rG. Because rB < rA, then to have uA(x4) = uB(x4), since uA(x4) =
∫ x4
rA
aA(w)dw =
(x4 − rA)aA(rA) and uB(x4) =
∫ x4
rB
aB(w)dw = (x4 − rB)aB(rB), then we must have a distinct
aA(rA) > aB(rB). This is depicted on the right side in Figure 6. Then, by Fact 3, aA(x3) =
aA(rA) > aB(rB).
The argument extends inductively for (x3, B), (x2, A), and (x1, B): we show it with (x3, B).
Note that uA(x4) = uB(x4) and suppose the inductive hypothesis of aA(x4) > aB(x4), where
aA(x3) = aA(x4) and aB(x4) = aB(rB) by Fact 3. Hence uA(sB) > uB(sB). Then in order to have
uA(x3) = uB(x3), we must have aB(x3) > aA(x3).
The result is four distinct allocation probabilities in these four regions, and five in total (in-
cluding the deterministic option to get the item w.p. one). Essentially, this example only has two
ironed intervals in A and B each with four points of interest. Our full construction below lets the
number of ironed intervals grow with M .
4.1.4 Final Step: M chains and a lower bound of M .
It is possible to extend the examples above by continuing to interleave ironed intervals with flow
coming in. The combination of the equal preferability constraints and the inability to increase the
allocation in the middle of an ironed interval is what requires us to randomize differently within
each interval, forcing any number of menu options. Details are given in Appendix E, where we
formally define this “top chain” structure (Definition 7) and construct the candidate dual instance,
which is depicted in Figure 7. For example, our first example has a top chain of length one, the
second of length two, and the third of length four. Theorem 2 proves that there exists a primal
instance that satisfies complementary slackness with the defined dual. This proves both that our
dual is optimal, and thus any optimal primal must satisfy complementary slackness with it, giving
us Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Mechanisms that satisfy complementary slackness with a dual containing a top chain
of length M have menu complexity at least M . Moreover, for all M , there exists a distribution F
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over three partially-ordered items for which a dual with top chain of length M is feasible.
The “Moreover, . . . ” part of the theorem is due to our Master Theorem (Theorem 9). The
formal statement is a bit technical, and can be found in Appendix H.
4.2 For Three Items, Menu Complexity is Finite: Brief Highlight
In Appendix F, we discuss our approach for characterizing the optimal mechanism for our 3-
item minimal instance. We prove essentially that the interleaving of ironed intervals used in the
construction of the previous section is the worst case (in terms of menu complexity). We do this
by specifying a subclass of optimal duals (that we call best duals) using two new dual operations,
double swaps and upper swaps. We then leverage the structure of the best duals to give an algorithm
that recovers the optimal primal from any best dual, and prove that the resulting mechanism has
finite menu complexity.
Theorem 2. For any best dual solution, the primal recovery algorithm returns a primal with finite
menu complexity that satisfies complementary slackness (and is therefore optimal).
We conclude with one vignette regarding how the menu complexity can be unbounded but
not infinite. Two crucial aspects of the “top chain” structure from our examples (generalized in
Figure 7) are that: (1) the ironed intervals for A and B are interleaving—this is what “keeps the
chain going” and (2) the sequences for A and B terminate at different bottom endpoints. The
latter is a bit subtle, but the idea is that if the two chains terminate at the same bottom endpoint
v, then this entire process can be aborted and simply setting v as the reserve for all items satisfies
complementary slackness. So while in principle, this top chain structure could indeed be countably
infinite, it cannot also satisfy (1) and (2). This is because the monotone convergence theorem states
that both chains do indeed converge to some bottom endpoint, and interleaving then guarantees
that this bottom endpoint must be the same.
4.3 One Last Example
In this section, we construct an example by applying the Master Theorem (Theorem 9) to the dual
in Figure 6. The customer prior distribution in the example consists of the marginal distributions
depicted in Figure 8. The distributions for A and B do not satisfy DMR, and, using the ideas from
the previous subsections, we will see that the optimal mechanism is randomized.
(a) Probability densities
(b) Revenue curves
Figure 8: The value distributions for items A, B, and C, that do not satisfy DMR.
We can use the revenue curve procedure from Appendix B to determine the optimal pricing for
this example. It produces the curves in Figure 8, telling us that the optimal price to set on item C is
15
8, which will result in prices of 9 on item A and 8 on item B. This gives RABC(8) = 3.155. However,
as we have seen in Section 4.1, for the dual in Figure 6 (which corresponds to this distribution)
to satisfy complementary slackness with a mechanism, the mechanism must have a good deal of
randomization.
In Section 4.1, we reasoned that the allocation probability must be distinct at each of the points
(x1, A), (x2, B), (x3, A), and (x4, B). We also saw that if we fixed the allocation at (x4, B), there
was only one way to satisfy the rest of the complementary slackness constraints, forming a system of
equations. The primal recovery algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 2 goes through solving
this system of equations, ensuring that any other additional complementary slackness constraints
are met, and that no pathological structures that might prevent a solution from existing can arise.
Applying this algorithm to our example results in the following optimal randomized mechanism:
aA(v) =

0 v < 1.5
4
7 v ∈ [1.5, 6)
6
7 v ∈ [6, 10)
1 v ≥ 10
aB(v) =

0 v < 1
2
7 v ∈ [1, 3)
5
7 v ∈ [3, 8)
1 v ≥ 8
aC(v) =

0 v < 1
2
7 v ∈ [1, 2)
4
7 v ∈ [2, 5)
5
7 v ∈ [5, 7)
6
7 v ∈ [7, 9)
1 v ≥ 9
.
The mechanism achieves a revenue of 3.2, which is slightly more than that of the best deterministic
mechanism.
5 Conclusions
We study optimal mechanisms for single-minded bidders, and show that the menu complexity of
optimal mechanisms is unbounded but finite for three items. Recall that for three identical items,
the menu complexity is 1, for totally-ordered items the menu complexity is at most 7, and for
heterogeneous items the menu complexity is uncountable. So our setting fits nicely “in between”
totally-ordered and heterogeneous by this measure. By fuzzier measures of complexity, the same
is true too: for identical items, the optimal mechanism has a clean closed-form description. For
totally-ordered items, the optimal dual has a closed form, and the primal can be recovered by
a simple algorithm as a function of this dual. For partially-ordered items, the optimal dual is
unlikely to have a closed form, but can be characterized in terms of properties it must satisfy, and
the primal can still be recovered algorithmically8 as a function of this dual. For heterogeneous items,
optimal mechanisms are pure chaos. And, like other settings that can be placed fundamentally in
between single- and multi- dimensional settings (e.g., FedEx and MUP), we prove that the optimal
mechanism is deterministic under DMR in the partially-ordered setting.
We also provide extensions—menu complexity of MUP (Theorem 12, Appendix I) and of coor-
dinated values (Theorems 14, 16, 17, Appendix J)—proving the usefulness of our techniques beyond
our setting.
Many interesting open directions remain. First, general menu complexity upper bounds—for
the single-minded setting, the Multi-Unit Pricing setting, and the coordinated valuations setting.
The techniques we use in this paper focus on characterizing the optimal dual and recovering the
optimal mechanism for the three-item single-minded setting; this approach appears to be far too
detailed and focused on characterizations to be extended. We expect new ideas to be needed.
8Contrast this with [Cai et al., 2012], which only claims that by solving a linear program, an optimal mechanism
for heterogenous settings can be found in time polynomial in the type space.
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Second, the question of menu-complexity lower bounds for any of these three settings for ap-
proximately-optimal mechanism are wide-open. Is the separation from FedEx still as large when
we only require approximately-optimal revenue?
Both directions of research would further fill out this rich spectrum, which until only recently
was but thought to be a dichotomy between single-dimensional and heterogenous.
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A Full Preliminaries
While this paper focuses on the three-item case, it’s illustrative (and perhaps cleaner) to provide
notation for general partially-ordered items. In general, there are m partially-ordered items. Item
G can be better than, worse than, or incomparable to item G′, and we’ll use the relation G  G′
to denote that G is better than G′. We refer to the set of items as G, and use N+(G) to denote
the set of items G′ ∈ G for which G′  G, but there is no G′′ with G′  G′′  G (i.e. the items
“immediately better” than G, or the 1-out-neighborhood of G in a graphic representation). There
is a single buyer with a (value, interest) pair (v,G), who receives value v if they are awarded an
item  G. An instance of the problem consists of a joint probability distribution over [0, H] × G,
where H is the maximum possible value of any bidder for any item. We will use f to denote the
density of this joint distribution, with fG(v) denoting the density at (v,G). We will also use FG(v)
to denote
∫ v
0 fG(w)dw, and qG to denote the probability that the bidder’s interest is G. Note that
FG(H) = qG < 1, so FG(·) is not the CDF of a distribution (although FG(·)/qG is the CDF of the
marginal distribution of v conditioned on interest G).
We’ll consider (w.l.o.g.) direct truthful mechanisms, where the bidder reports a (value, interest)
pair and is awarded a (possibly randomized) item. For a direct mechanism, we’ll define aG(v) to be
the probability that item G is awarded to a bidder who reports (v,G), and pG(v) to be the expected
payment charged. Then a buyer’s utility for reporting any (v′, G′) where G′ doesn’t dominate G is
−pG′(v′), and the utility for reporting any (v′, G′) where G′ dominates G is v · aG′(v′)− pG′(v′).
At this point, one can write a primal LP that maximizes expected revenue subject to incentive
constraints, manipulate the LP, and consider a Lagrangian relaxation (and all of this is done in Fiat
et al. [2016]; Devanur and Weinberg [2017]).
A.1 Formulating the Optimization Problem
The “default” way to write the continuous LP characterizing the optimal mechanism would be
to maximize
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0 fG(v)pG(v)dv (the expected revenue) such that everyone prefers to tell
the truth than to report any other type. As observed in Fiat et al. [2016], it is without loss of
generality to only consider mechanisms that award bidders their declared item of interest with
probability in [0, 1], and all other items with probability 0.9 Also observed in Fiat et al. [2016] is
that Myerson’s payment identity holds in this setting as well, and any truthful mechanism must
satisfy pG(v) = vaG(v) −
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw (this also implies that the bidder’s utility when truthfully
reporting (v,G) is uG(v) =
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw). This allows us to drop the payment variables, and follow
Myerson’s analysis to recover:10
E[revenue] =
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v) · pG(v)dv =
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v)aG(v)
(
v − 1− FG(v)
fG(v)
)
dv
The experienced reader will notice that v − 1−FG(v)fG(v) is exactly Myerson’s virtual value for the
conditional distribution FG(·)/qG, which we’ll denote by ϕG(v). At this point, we still have a
continuous LP with only allocation variables, but still lots of truthfulness constraints. Fiat et al.
9To see this, observe that the bidder is just as happy to get nothing instead of an item that doesn’t dominate
their interest. See also that they are just as happy to get their interest item instead of any item that dominates it.
It will also make this option no more attractive to any bidder considering misreporting. So starting from a truthful
mechanism, modifying it to only award the item of declared interest or nothing cannot possibly violate truthfulness.
10For the familiar reader, this derivation is routine, so we omit it. The unfamiliar reader can refer to [Myerson,
1981; Hartline, 2013] for this derivation.
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[2016] observe that many of these constraints are redundant, and in fact it suffices to only make
sure that when the bidder has (value, interest) pair (v,G) they:
• Prefer to tell the truth rather than report any other (v′, G). This is accomplished by con-
straining aG(·) to be monotone non-decreasing (exactly as in the single-item setting).
• Prefer to tell the truth rather than report any other (v,G′ ∈ N+(G)). This is accomplished
by constraining
∫ v
0 aG(w)dw ≥
∫ v
0 aG′(w)dw (as the LHS denotes the utility of the buyer for
reporting (v,G) and the RHS denote the utility of the buyer for reporting (v,G′)).
All of these constraints together imply that (v,G) also does not prefer to report any other (v′, G′).11
Below, we will now formulate the Primal LP and its Lagrangian relaxation. This derivation is not
a new result, but important to understanding our approach. So we’ll go through some of the steps
to help provide some intuition for the reader, but omit any calculations and proofs.
A.2 The Primal
With the above discussion in mind, we can now formulate our primal continuous LP.
Variables: aG(v), ∀G ∈ G, v ∈ [0, H]
Maximize
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v)aG(v)ϕG(v)dv
subject to a′G(v) ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ G ∀v ∈ [0, H] (dual variables λG(v) ≥ 0)∫ v
0
aG(x)dx−
∫ v
0
aG′(x)dx ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ G, G′ ∈ N+(G) ∀v ∈ [0, H] (dual vars αG,G′(v) ≥ 0)
aG(v) ∈ [0, 1] ∀G ∈ G, ∀v ∈ [0, H] (no dual variables)
The first constraint requires that aG(·) is monotone non-decreasing for all G. If an allocation
rule is not monotone, it cannot possibly be part of a truthful mechanism. As discussed above,
Myerson’s payment identity combined with monotonicity guarantees that (v,G) will always prefer
to report (v,G) instead of (v′, G). The second constraint directly requires that the utility of (v,G)
for reporting (v,G) is at least as high as for reporting (v,G′) (also discussed above). The final
constraint simply ensures that the allocation probabilities lie in [0, 1].
A.3 Derivation of the Partial Lagrangian Dual
Moving the first two types of constraints from the primal to the objective function with multipliers
λG(v) and αG,G′(v) respectively gives the partial Lagrangian primal:
max
a:aG(v)∈[0,1] ∀G∈G,∀v∈[0,H]
min
λ,α≥0
L(a;λ, α)
11 For example, if (v,G) prefers truthful reporting to reporting (v,G′) where G′  G, and (v,G′) prefers truthful
reporting to reporting (v′, G′), then since (v,G) gets the same utility for reporting (v,G′) as type (v,G′) does for
truthfully reporting, (v,G) prefers truthful reporting to reporting (v′, G′).
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where
L(a;λ, α) :=∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v)aG(v)ϕG(v) + ∑
G′∈N+(G)
αG,G′(v) ·
[∫ v
0
aG(x)dx−
∫ v
0
aG′(x)dx
]
+ λG(v)a
′
G(v)
 dv.
This gives the corresponding partial Lagrangian dual of
min
λ,α≥0
max
a:aG(v)∈[0,1] ∀G∈G,∀v∈[0,H]
L(a;λ, α).
Note however that we can rewrite L(a;λ, α) by using integration by parts on the a′G(v) term to get
aG(v) terms, using that aG(0) = 0 and λG(H) = 0 without loss:∫ H
0
λG(v)a
′
G(v)dv = λG(v)aG(v) |H0 −
∫ H
0
λ′G(v)aG(v)dv = −
∫ H
0
λ′G(v)aG(v)dv
As in [FGKK16], this uses the facts that λG(·) is continuous and equal to 0 at any point that
a′G(v) =∞, which occurs at only countably many points. Then, collecting the aG(v) terms gives:
L(a;λ, α) =
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
[
fG(v)aG(v)ϕG(v)
+
∑
G′∈N+(G)
αG,G′(v) ·
[∫ v
0
aG(x)dx−
∫ v
0
aG′(x)dx
]
− λ′G(v)aG(v)
]
dv
=
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v)aG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v)dv
where we define
Φλ,αG (v) := ϕG(v)+
1
fG(v)
·
 ∑
G′∈N+(G)
∫ H
v
αG,G′(x)dx−
∑
G′:G∈N+(G′)
∫ H
v
αG′,G(v)dx
− 1
fG(v)
λ′G(v).
Then we can write that the Lagrangian dual problem is
min
λ,α≥0
max
a:aG(v)∈[0,1] ∀G∈G,∀v∈[0,H]
∑
G∈G
∫ H
0
fG(v)aG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v)dv.
A.4 More Dual Terminology
Minimal dual terminology is first introduced in subsection 3.1. Here, we add a few additional terms.
Dual best response (condition (5)) implies the following.
• (Preferable Items) To satisfy complementary slackness, for any x such that αG,G′(x) > 0,
we must have uG′(x) ≥ uG′′(x) ∀G′′ ∈ N+(G). This is because (a) uG(x) = uG′(x) by
complementary slackness and (b) uG(x) ≥ uG′′(x) ∀G′′ ∈ N+(G) by incentive compatibility.
• (Equally Preferable Items) By the above, to satisfy complementary slackness with any dual
with αG,G′(x) > 0 and αG,G′′(x) > 0, we must have uG′(x) = uG′′(x).
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A.5 Review of Dual Properties
• (Rerouting Flow Among N+(G)) If G′, G′′ ∈ N+(G) and we decrease αG,G′(v) by ε and in-
crease αG,G′′(v) by ε, then v
′ ≤ v, fG′(v′)Φλ,αG′ (v′) decreases by ε and fG′′(v′)Φλ,αG′′ (v′) increases
by ε. All other virtual values, including all of those within G, remain the same.
• (Utility based on the dual) We can often simplify how utility is written in terms of the dual
and complementary slackness constraints. If xG < x < y < xG, then allocation in ironed
intervals implies uG(y) = uG(x) + aG(y)(y − x).
• (Allocation to Nonzero Virtual Values) As shown above in Subection 3.2, the dual variables (1)
determine the virtual welfare functions Φλ,α(·) and (2) are chosen to minimize the maximum
virtual welfare under Φλ,α(·). For an optimal dual solution, the optimal mechanism will simply
be the corresponding virtual welfare maximizer that satisfies complementary slackness. Parts
of this mechanism are easy to predict if the virtual value functions are sign-monotone, which
we will later ensure that they are. Assuming this, we can talk about the virtual values in
terms of three regions: positives, negatives, and zeroes.
• (Ironing and Proper Monotonicity.) We say that a dual satisfies proper monotonicity if
fG · Φλ,αG (·) is monotone non-decreasing (note the multiplier of fG). As shown in [FGKK16;
DW17], for all α, there exists a λ such that (λ, α) is properly monotone.
• (Boosting can only improve the dual.) Given any dual with properly monotone virtual val-
ues, if there exists v such that fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) < 0, then for any G
′ ∈ N+(G), incrementing
αG,G′(v) by fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) only improves the dual. By proper monotonicity, for all v
′ ≤ v,
fG(v
′)Φλ,αG (v
′) < fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) < 0, hence increasing αG,G′(v) will not create any positives
within G, not hurting the dual objective. Sending flow into an item G′ can only help by
making positives less so, and does not increase any virtual values (but it’s possible that it
doesn’t strictly help). This operation is coined boosting in [DW17]. While it is clear that G
should send the flow, the remaining question is which G′ ∈ N+(G) should the flow be sent
to. This is the bulk of our analysis.
• By sign monotonicity, v > r¯G has a positive virtual value, and thus the allocation rule must
set aG(v) = 1, otherwise it is not maximizing virtual welfare.
• Similarly, for values with negative virtual values, that is, v < rG, it must be that aG(v) = 0.
From these observations, we can conclude that the flow out of C is identical to the flow out of
the root node (day n) in the FedEx solution. That is,
αC,A(v) + αC,B(v) =
{
0 v > r¯C
−Rˆ′′C(v)/fC(v) v ≤ r¯C .
where RC(·) is defined as in Definition 1, RˆC(·) is the least concave upper bound on RC(·), and
Rˆ′′C(·) is the second derivative of this function with respect to v.
We conclude with a fundamental result from [FGKK16].
Theorem 3 (Proper Ironing [FGKK16]). Given all dual variables α, suppose λG(v) = 0 for all
(v,G). Then fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) is defined for all (v,G). We define ΓG(v) = −
∫ v
0 fG(x)Φ
λ,α
G (x)dx, and
ΓˆG(·) is the least concave upper bound on this function. Then setting λG(v) = ΓˆG(v)−ΓG(v) defines
a continuous and differentiable λG(·) that, with the update of Φλ,αG (·) based on λG(·), results in the
proper monotonicity of fG(·)Φλ,αG (·).
23
B Three Illustrative Examples
In this section, we use three example instances to understand how the optimal mechanisms become
increasingly complex, blowing up from deterministic prices to unbounded randomization. We begin
with some intuition before diving into examples.
Intuition: Why is single-minded more complex? Consider first a one-item setting that only
sells 2-day shipping. Myerson’s seminal work proves that the optimal way to sell 2-day shipping
in isolation is to post the monopoly reserve price for it. Consider next retroactively adding 1-day
shipping into the mix, perhaps because some customers demand 1-day shipping and aren’t satisfied
with 2-day shipping. Perhaps the distribution of customers demanding 1-day shipping has a higher
Myerson reserve than the initial 2-day shipping distribution, in which case it is consistent to set
both optimal reserves. Note, however, that a customer who wants their package within 2 days
would be content with 1-day shipping. So if instead the 1-day shipping distribution has a lower
Myerson reserve than 2-day shipping, posting the pair of Myerson reserves is no longer incentive
compatible. This complexity arises in the FedEx problem Fiat et al. [2016], and requires considering
the constraints imposed on 2-day shipping by 1-day shipping (or vice versa).
Now consider the simplest single-minded valuation setting. The internet service provider (ISP)
sells three options: wifi, wifi/cable, and wifi/phone, where wifi/cable and wifi/phone dominate wifi
but are incomparable with each other. If it happens to be that the distribution of consumers who
are interested in wifi/cable or wifi/phone both have a higher Myerson reserve than the distribution
of consumers who are interested in only wifi,12 then again the seller can simply offer all three op-
tions at their Myerson reserve. However, if this is not the case, further optimization must be done.
Importantly, in contrast to the FedEx setting, there’s a circular dependency involving these three
options which doesn’t arise in the totally-ordered case (see examples for further detail). In this
way, the IC constraints that govern the mechanism are much more complex in the single-minded
setting than in the FedEx setting, and are the reason both for developing much richer techniques
and for the much higher degree of randomization that is seen in our results.
Now, we explain what the optimal mechanism looks like for (1) the minimal partially-ordered
(single-minded) instance under DMR, (2) the minimal totally-ordered (FedEx) instance without
DMR, and (3) the minimal partially-ordered instance without DMR.
Three Partially-Ordered Items under DMR. We begin with the special case where the
marginal distributions for each item satisfy DMR. Recall that this implies that the marginal revenue
curves for each item are concave, and thus do not require ironing. We show how to derive the
optimal item pricing (but a proof that this is indeed optimal is deferred to Appendix C as part of
the general DMR case). Our instance is again that where C is the worst item (e.g. wifi) and A and
B are incomparable (e.g. wifi/cable and wifi/phone).
Let’s start by considering what price we would set for item A if we had already set price pC for
item C. (Note that whatever price we set for item B has no effect, as A and B are incomparable.)
Observe that our revenue from setting any price pA is just pA · [1 − FA(pA)], so ideally we would
just set price rA := arg maxp{p · [1 − FA(p)]}. If rA ≥ pC , this doesn’t violate any IC constraints.
Indeed, consumers with interest C will prefer to pay pC ≤ rA to get item C rather than item A. If
12Recall that a one-dimensional distribution D can stochastically dominate D′ yet have a lower Myerson reserve.
For example, if D is uniform over the set {1, 10}, the Myerson reserve is 10. If D is uniform over the set {9, 10}, the
Myerson reserve is 9.
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rA < pC , however, setting price rA will violate IC, as now consumers with interest C would strictly
prefer to report interest in item A instead. This constrains us to set a price for A that is at least
pC . Observe that, because RA(·) is concave, the revenue-maximizing price to set that is at least pC
(which is > rA) is pA := pC . Hence, we can define the revenue curve R¯A(·) to describe the revenue
we can get from selling item A as a function of pC :
R¯A(pC) =
{
RA(rA) pC ≤ rA
RA(pC) pC > rA
.
The same definition holds for R¯B(·). Now, we can find the price to set for item C that optimizes
the impact on all three items by simply finding the p maximizing RABC(p) := RC(p)+R¯A(p)+R¯B(p)
(depicted in Figure 9). Picking pC as such, and then setting pA := max{rA, pC}, pB := max{rB, pC}
is the optimal pricing. The (challenging) remaining step is to prove that in fact this is optimal even
among randomized mechanisms. The duality theory previously hinted at is key in this step, but we
postpone these details for now. Importantly, note that this claim requires the DMR assumption (so
proving it will certainly be technically involved)—without it, there might be a better randomized
mechanism.
Figure 9: The construction of RABC with RA, R¯A, RB, R¯B, and RC illustrated as well.
Two Items without DMR (FedEx). In this example, there are only two items, A and C with
A  C. In this case, we’ll think about first setting the price for A, and understanding how it
constrains our choices for C. If we set price pA for item A, then we are constrained to give every
type (v, C) interested in item C utility at least v − pA. Again, if rC ≤ pA, we should just set price
rC on item C. However, if rC > pA, without the DMR assumption, it’s unclear what the best price
to set should be. Indeed, it could be that some price pC  pA generates more revenue than pA as
RC(·) is not necessarily concave. Note, however, that the ironed revenue curve RˆC(·) is concave.
So arg maxpC≤pA{RˆC(pC)} = min{rC , pA}. It’s unclear exactly what to make of this, but one hope
(that turns out to be correct), is that the optimal scheme for item C, conditioned on pA, is to set
expected price pC := min{rC , pA} via the allocation rule defined as in Definition 4. It is not obvious
that such an allocation rule satisfies IC, but straight-forward calculations confirm that indeed it
does. Similarly to the previous example, we can now define:
R¯C(pA) =
{
RˆC(pA) pA < rC
RC(rC) pA ≥ rC
and RAC(pA) = RA(pA) + R¯C(pA).
This construction is depicted in Figure 10. Figure 11 gives some intuition as to why it is indeed
incentive compatible to set the proposed allocation rule for item C (but the goal of this section is
not to provide complete proofs). It is now clear that, among all options which set a deterministic
price for item A, and implement an expected price on the ironed revenue curve for item C, the
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above procedure is optimal. What is not clear is why this procedure is optimal over all possible
menus for item C, or even why a randomized menu for item A can’t perform better. Indeed, the
same duality theory referenced previously takes care of this.
This example perhaps also gives intuition for the menu complexity upper bound of 2m − 1 for
FedEx. Repeating this process for another totally-ordered item, each option offered to buyers with
interest C could be “split” into at most two new options to be offered to buyers with interest
D ≺ C.
Figure 10: A worse-to-better item rev-
enue curve for the FedEx setting that
determines the optimal mechanism even
without DMR.
Figure 11: Utility for items A and C are equal
for v ≤ p and v ≥ p, but for v ∈ (p, p), the
randomized option provides more utility.
Three Partially-Ordered Items without DMR. In our first example, we reasoned about
how our decision for item C constrains which prices to set for items A and B. In our second
example, we reasoned about how our decision for item A constrains prices to set for item C.
We presented the opposite direction (1) to present both types of arguments and (2) because this
direction is necessary without the DMR assumption. For partially-ordered items, however, we
really can only reason about how decisions for item C constrain prices for A and B. The reason is
that in order to know how pA constrains our options for item C, we also need to know pB. Indeed,
only min{pA, pB} matters for constraining C. So we would need to know pB to know whether a
proposed pA is imposing a new constraint or not. This results in an impasse for this approach: this
partial order requires us to reason about C’s price first, but without DMR, we must reason about
A and B first. However, this is only intuition as to why this setting becomes more complicated.
In Section 4.1, we explain why it is that the IC constraints can cause the randomization to get so
unwieldy, and Section 4.3 cements this with an example.
Note, however, that we can still reason as we previously did about the optimal item pricing. If,
as in the first example, we define R¯A(pC) to be the revenue from selling item A at the optimal price
that exceeds pC , and R¯B(pC) similarly for item B, then RABC(pC) := RC(pC) + R¯B(pC) + R¯A(pC)
accurately defines the revenue we get from all three items by setting price pC on item C, and setting
the optimal prices for A and B conditioned on this.
C An Exact Characterization Under the Assumption of DMR
Recall from Subsection 2.2 that when the distributions satisfy DMR, λG(v) = 0 for all (v,G). Our
main result in this section is the following:
26
Theorem 4. Consider any partially-ordered preferences for items G,. If the marginal distribution
for each item satisfies DMR, the optimal mechanism is deterministic.
For a deterministic mechanism, we will set a take-it-or-leave-it price pG for each item G.
C.1 Intuition
It will turn out that the optimal mechanism is analogous to that in FedEx and will set prices as
follows:
• For items G that are sink nodes in the DAG, set pG = rG.
• Starting from the sink nodes and visiting nodes in reverse depth, we will define a least
upper bound on each node’s price based on the prices set for nodes that dominate it. We
define p¯G = minG′∈N+(G) p¯G′ to be the least upper bound on G’s price. Then set a price of
pG = min{p¯G, rG} for G.
In our pricing algorithm, nodes G are limited by the smallest rA for any A that they have a
directed path to. From complementary slackness, every rA that a node G has a path to is an upper
bound on the price that can be set for G, so the smallest of these upper bounds is the most limiting.
We define p¯G to be this smallest upper bound, and we define LG to be the nodes from N
+(G) who
are also constrained by this upper bound. Thus, if we follow the sets LG, we will find all of the
limiting nodes with rA = p¯G.
When we send flow out of G, we aim to send it along the paths to the nodes that limit G’s
price the most. We do this recursively, sending from G to the most limiting neighbor, and from
there to that node’s most limiting neighbor, splitting the flow equally if there are several limiting
neighbors. This raises the limiting reserve and never lowers it. We update regularly to ensure that
we are always sending flow to the now-limiting reserve, raising it, and thus relaxing the constraints
on G. This is almost exactly the construction: the only caveat is that we should never send flow
out of an item B at v where fB(v)Φ
λ,α
B (v) > 0. If we send into a B along the path where this is
the case, we instead send flow out at rB < v.
C.2 Formal Pricing Algorithm
Formally, we set the dual variables according to the following algorithm:
Dual variable construction:
Base case: For sink nodes A, there is nowhere to send flow. Set p¯A = rA.
for all nodes A starting from the sink nodes and in increasing reverse depth 13 do
p¯A = minB∈N+(A) p¯B
For all v from rA down to 0, determine the minimal amount of flow out σA such that ϕA(v) = 0.
for v from 0 to rA do
Update(A, v, σA(v))
Update(A, v, γ):
Let LA := {arg minB∈N+(A) p¯B}.
for all B ∈ LA do
Send αA,B(v) =
1
|LA|γ.
13i.e. # edges from sink nodes
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Update(B,min{v, rB}, γ).
The key idea is that the price of a node G is limited by the smallest rA where A is some item
better than G (i.e. there is a path from G to A in the DAG). As we send flow along the path to
A, we raise rA and it becomes less limiting. Let SG be the set of the items that limit G the most,
which are precisely the items A such that rA = p¯G. Since we are in the continuous setting, sending
flow is a continuous process. This means that the most limiting item never discretely jumps up
higher and becomes no longer limiting. Instead, all limiting items stay in the set SG and this set
grows as the upper bounds raise and become less limiting.
Let LG ⊆ N+(G) to be the items such that, for all B ∈ LG, there exists v such that αG,B(v) > 0.
What this means is that p¯G = p¯B, and B is on the path (if not the end of the path) from G to a
limiting item A ∈ SG. We will use the variable r to keep track of the updated p¯G. If A ∈ SG, then
fA(r)Φ
λ,α
A (r) = 0, and if B is on a path to some limiting A, then fB(r)Φ
λ,α
B (r) ≤ 0. In every step
we decrease the amount of flow to send and the algorithm will terminate when there is no flow left
to send. Throughout this process the point r and the set SG both only increase.
First, we set the flow out of G:∑
A∈N+(G)
αG,A(v) =
{
0 v > r¯G
−Rˆ′′G(v)/fG(v) v ≤ r¯G.
Lemma 1. For every G, we can always send σG out of G distributed among N
+(G) such that
1. If αG,B(x) > 0 for any x, then B ∈ LG.
2. If B ∈ LG, then fB(r)Φλ,αB (r) = 0.
3. If B ∈ N+(G)r LG, then r < rB and thus fB(r)Φλ,αB (r) ≤ 0.
Proof. Suppose we have σG(v) flow to send at v. Let Z = arg minB∈N+(G)rLG pB be the next
possible upper bound to hit.
Let ε be such that by sending σG flow along paths to all items in SG with correct proportions,
we will maintain SG and raise r by ε. That is,∑
A∈SG
fA(r + ε)Φ
λ,α
A (r + ε) = σ.
If r + ε < pZ , we can send this flow without growing SG. Let P(G,A) denote the edges forming
every path from G to A. For every (C,D) ∈ P(G,A) for some A ∈ SG, we set
αC,D(v) =
∑
A∈SG:(C,D)∈P(G,A)
fA(r + ε)Φ
λ,α
A (r + ε) ∀A ∈ LG.
This will ensure that after this update, fA(r+ ε)Φ
λ,α
A (r+ ε) = 0 for all A ∈ SG. Update r ← r+ ε.
Note that (2) holds by construction, and (3) holds since r < pZ < pB for all B ∈ N+(G)r LG.
Otherwise, suppose r + ε ≥ pZ and v ≥ pZ . Then we instead choose ε = pZ − r and make the
same update described above, add Z to LG and add the item Y that is limiting Z, that is, Y such
that pZ = RY , to SG. Note that we have sent positive flow, but the flow sent is < σ. After the
update, we will have r ← r+ ε = pZ and fA(r)Φλ,αA (r) = 0 for all A ∈ SG, including Y . Then again
(2) holds, and (3) holds since r = pZ < pB for all B ∈ N+(G)r LG.
Finally, (1) holds in both cases as we only send flow to elements of SG and SG is non-decreasing.
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Lemma 2. For every v and G, our choice of αG,A(w) for all w ∈ [0, H], A ∈ N+(G) maintains
λG(v) = 0 for all v.
Proof. Since the flow out of G is chosen exactly to bring all virtual values to 0 below r¯G, no
non-monotonicities are caused.
Lemma 3. For every v and G, any choice of αA,G(w) for all w ∈ [0, H], A ∈ N−(G) maintains
λG(v) = 0 for all v.
Proof. Suppose we get flow α into G at x. Every value v ≤ x has fG(v)Φλ,αG (v) decrease by α while
this remains unchanged for v > x, causing no non-monotonicities.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4. We claim the the following deterministic allocation rule always satisfies com-
plementary slackness with the dual: set pG = min{rG, rA : A ∈ SG}.
From DMR and our setting of λ, we will have λG(v) = 0 for all (v,G), automatically satisfying
complementary slackness for these variables. Further, even after sending α flow, fG(·)Φλ,αG (·) will
be properly monotone for all G by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
First, we verify that the when we set a price, the virtual values are 0 at that price, so we have
the freedom to do so. By Lemma 1, fA(r)Φ
λ,α
A (r) = 0 for all A ∈ SG. Of course, by definition of
r¯, fA(rA)Φ
λ,α
A (rA) = 0. In addition, by definition of the flow out of G, fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) = 0 for all
v ≤ r¯G so fG(r)Φλ,αG (r) = 0. Then all of the prices posted are viable.
It remains to choose a mechanism that satisfies complementary slackness with the α variables.
If αG,B(v) > 0 for some v then we know that (1) B ∈ LG and (2) v < r¯G. By Lemma 1, the variable
αG,B(v) > 0 for any v if and only if v ∈ LG, a monotone increasing set as v increases. In this case,
then p¯B = p¯G and both are set at this price, satisfying uG(v) = uB(v) for all v and automatically
satisfying complementary slackness.
D An Extension of FedEx: DAGs with Out-Degree At Most 1
In this section, we consider DAGs with out-degree at most 1. That is, partial orders that are
tree-like, where each item has at most one item that minimally dominates it. In this case, we see
that the FedEx solution applies.
Theorem 5. Consider any partially-ordered preferences for items G, such that for any G, there
exists at most one G′′ that minimally dominates G: that is, G′′  G and there does not exist
any G′ where G′′  G′  G. Then a nearly identical construction to the FedEx Problem with a
minor modification for partial orderings yields closed-form optimal dual variables and the optimal
mechanism.
We use the notation and methods of [FGKK16]. The proof is almost identical, provided for
completeness, and much of the following is duplicated from their paper, with a slight modification
to allow for the DAG structure with out-degree at most 1. The key difference is the change in
definition of the Γ≥G curves.
We recall the following definitions from their paper:
• Let γG(v) := ϕG(v)fG(v). Recall that ϕG(·) = v − 1−FG(v)fG(v) .
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• Let ΓG(v) =
∫ v
0 γG(x)dx. As shown in [FGKK16], this function is the negative of the marginal
revenue curve for item G. Thus, ΓG(0) = ΓG(H) = 0 and ΓG(v) ≤ 0 for v ∈ [0, H].
• For any function Γ, define Γˆ(·) to be the lower convex envelope 14 of Γ(·). We say that Γˆ(·)
is ironed at v if Γˆ(v) 6= Γ(v).
Since Γˆ(·) is convex, it is continuously differentiable except at countably many points and its
derivative is monotone (weakly) increasing.
• Let γˆ(·) be the derivative of Γˆ(·) and let γ(·) be the derivative of Γ(·).
As shown in [FGKK16], the following facts are immediate from the definition of lower convex
envelope:
• Γˆ(v) ≤ Γ(v) ∀v.
• Γˆ(vmin) = Γ(vmin) where vmin = argminvΓ(v). (This implies that there is no ironed interval
containing vmin.)
• γˆ(v) is an increasing function of v and hence its derivative γˆ′(v) ≥ 0 is non-negative for all v.
• If Γˆ(v) is ironed in the interval [`, h] , then γˆ(v) is linear and γˆ′(v) = 0 in (`, h).
Now, we redefine the functions Γ≥i, which are used to set all of the FedEx dual variables, and
can be interpreted as negative combined revenue curves for deadlines i through m. Instead, we
redefine them for an item G and all dominated items. In a DAG, we let the set of all source nodes,
that is, items that dominate no other items in the partial order, be the set S. Similarly, we call the
set of sinks, items that are dominated by no other items, as the set T .
Note that, by assumption, every item has out-degree at most 1. Then the set of items that
minimally dominate an item G, N+(G), is of size 0 or 1. If it is of size 0, then G ∈ T : G is a sink
node. That is:
Observation 1. For all G 6∈ T , |N+(G)| = 1.
For this reason, we define the following notation.
Definition 5. For G 6∈ T , let D(G) refer to the single item that minimally dominates G: G′ ∈
N+(G).
Now, for any source node G ∈ S, define Γ≥G = ΓG. We will define the curves Γ≥G for G ∈ GrG
inductively. Let define r≥G := max arg min Γ≥G(v). Then define
Γ¯≥G(v) :=
{
Γˆ≥G(v) v < r≥G
Γ≥G(r≥G) v ≥ r≥G.
Now, for all G that are not source nodes, we can inductively define
Γ≥G(v) := ΓG(v) +
∑
G′∈N−(G)
Γ¯≥G′(v).
Note then that
γ¯≥G =
{
γˆ≥G v ≤ r≥G
0 v > r≥G
and γ≥G = γG +
∑
G′∈N−(G)
γ¯≥G′(v).
14 The lower convex envelope of function f(x) is the supremum over convex functions g(·) such that g(x) ≤ f(x)
for all x. Notice that the lower convex envelope of Γ(·) is the negative of the ironed revenue curve Rˆ(v).
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D.1 Primal, Dual, and Complementary Slackness
We use the following primal and dual formulations with the noted complementary slackness condi-
tions. They are virtually identical to FedEx, modified for the DAG, and much of it is copied from
[FGKK16].
The Primal
Variables: aG(v), for all G ∈ G, and all v ∈ [0, H].
Maximize
∑
G
∫ H
0
aG(v)γG(v)dv
Subject to∫ v
0
aG(x)dx−
∫ v
0
aG′(x)dx ≤ 0 ∀G ∈ G r S,G′ ∈ N−(G) ∀v ∈ [0, H] (dual variables αG′,G(v))
aG(v) ≤ 1 ∀G ∈ G ∀v ∈ [0, H] (dual variables bG(v))
−a′G(v) ≤ 0 ∀G ∈ G ∀v ∈ [0, H] (dual variables λG(v))
aG(v) ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ G ∀v ∈ [0, H].
Note that a′G(v) denotes
d
dvaG(v).
The Dual
Variables: bG(v), λG(v), for all G ∈ G, and all v ∈ [0, H], αG′,G(x) for G ∈ G r S,G′ ∈ N−(G) and
all x ∈ [0, H].
Minimize
∫ H
0
∑
G∈G
bG(v)dv
Subject to
bG(v) + λ
′
G(v) +
∑
G′∈N−(G)
∫ H
v
αG′,G(x)dx ≥ γG(v) ∀v ∈ [0, H], G ∈ S (primal var aG(v))
bG(v) + λ
′
G(v) +
∑
G′∈N−(G)
∫ H
v
αG′,G(x)dx ∀v ∈ [0, H], i ∈ G r S, T
−
∫ H
v
αG,D(G)(x)dx ≥ γG(v) (primal var aG(v))
bG(v) + λ
′
G(v)−
∫ H
v
αG,D(G)(x)dx ≥ γG(v) ∀v ∈ [0, H], G ∈ T (primal var aG(v))
λG(H) = 0 ∀G ∈ G
αG′,G(v) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ [0, H], G ∈ G r S,G′ ∈ N−(G)
bG(v), λG(v) ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ G∀v ∈ [0, H].
Note that λ′G(v) denotes
d
dvλG(v).
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D.2 Conditions for strong duality
As long as there are feasible primal and dual solutions satisfying the following conditions, strong
duality holds. Theorem 3 from [FGKK16] proves that these conditions are sufficient.
aG(v) > 0 ⇒ λG(v) continuous at v G ∈ G (6)
aG(v) < 1 ⇒ bG(v) = 0 G ∈ G (7)
a′G(v) > 0 ⇒ λG(v) = 0 G ∈ G (8)∫ v
0
aG(x)dx <
∫ v
0
aG′(x)dx ⇒ αG′,G(v) = 0 G ∈ G \ S,G′ ∈ N−(G)(9)
bG(v) + λ
′
G(v) +
∑
G′∈N−(G)
∫ H
v
αG′,G(x)dx
−
∫ H
v
αG,D(G)(x)dx > γG(v) ⇒ aG(v) = 0 G ∈ G r S, T (10)
bG(v) + λ
′
G(v) +
∑
G′∈N−(G)
∫ H
v
αG′,G(x)dx > γG(v) ⇒ aG(v) = 0 G ∈ T (11)
bG(v) + λ
′
G(v)−
∫ H
v
αG,D(G)(x)dx > γG(v) ⇒ aG(v) = 0 G ∈ S (12)
We allow a′G(v) ∈ R ∪ {+∞}. It may have (countably many) discontinuities. However, the
proof of optimality in [FGKK16] handles this.
D.3 Optimal Primal Variables
We determine the allocation rules inductively, from sink nodes all the way to source nodes. First,
for sink nodes G ∈ T , set
aG(v) =
{
0 v < r≥G
1 v ≥ r≥G.
Suppose that aG′ has been defined for G
′ = D(G), with jumps at v1, . . . , vk, and values 0 =
β0 < β1 ≤ β2 . . . ≤ βk = 1. That is,
aG′(v) =

0 if v < v1,
βj vj ≤ v < vj+1 1 ≤ j < k
1 vk ≤ v.
Thus, we can write
aG′(v) =
k∑
j=1
(βj − βj−1)aG′,j(v)
where
aG′,j(v) =
{
0 if v < vj
1 v ≥ vj .
Next we define aG(v).
Definition 6. Let j∗ be the largest j such that vj ≤ r≥G. For any j ≤ j∗, consider two cases:
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• Γˆ≥G(vj) = Γ≥G(vj), i.e. Γˆ≥G not ironed at vj : In this case, define
aG,j(v) =
{
0 if v < vj
1 otherwise.
.
• Γˆ≥G(vj) 6= Γ≥G(vj): In this case, let
– vj := the largest v < vj such that Γˆ≥G(v) = Γ≥G(v) i.e., not ironed, and
– vj := the smallest v > vj such that Γˆ≥G(v) = Γ≥G(v) i.e., not ironed.
Let 0 < δ < 1 such that
vj = δvj + (1− δ)vj .
Then Γˆ≥G(·) is linear between vj and vj :
Γˆ≥G(vj) = δΓ≥G(vj) + (1− δ)Γ≥G(vj).
Define
aG,j(v) =

0 if v < vj
δ vj ≤ v < vj
1 otherwise.
Finally, set aG(v) as follows:
aG(v) =

∑j∗
j=1(βj − βj−1)aG,j(v) if v < r≥G,
1 v ≥ r≥G.
(13)
Remark: In order to continue the induction and define aG′′(v) for G = D(G
′′), we need to rewrite
aG(v) in terms of functions aG,j(v) that take only 0/1 values. This is straightforward.
D.4 Closed-Form Dual Variables and Proof of Optimality
The following dual variables and proofs are again almost verbatim from [FGKK16] with very small
modifications for the DAG structure.
λG(v) = Γ≥G(v)− Γˆ≥G(v) (14)
bG(v) =
{
0 v < r≥G
γˆ≥G(v) v ≥ r≥G
(15)
αG′,G(v) =
{
γˆ′≥G′(v) v < r≥G′
0 v ≥ r≥G′
for G ∈ G r S,G′ ∈ N−(G) (16)
Taking the derivative of (14), and using the definition of Γ, we obtain:
γG(v)− λ′G(v) = γˆ≥G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)
γ¯≥G′(v) for G ∈ G r S (17)
γG(v)− λ′G(v) = γˆG(v) for G ∈ S (18)
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Also, using (16) and the fact that γˆ≥i+1(r≥i+1) = 0, we get:
AG′,G(v) :=
∫ H
v
αG′,G(x) dx =
{
−γˆ≥G′(v) v < r≥G′
0 v ≥ r≥G′
= −γ¯≥G′(v) (19)
Claim. Conditions (10)–(12) and dual feasibility: For all G and v, aG(v) > 0 =⇒ the correspond-
ing dual constraint is tight, and the dual constraints are always feasible.
Proof. Rearrange the dual constraint bG(v) +
∑
G′∈N−(G)AG′,G(v) − AG,D(G)(v) + λ′G(v) ≥ γG(v)
to
bG(v)−AG,D(G)(v) ≥ γG(v)− λ′G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)
AG′,G(v).
Fact 1: For G 6∈ S, γG(v)− λ′G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)AG′,G(v) = γˆ≥G(v) for all v. To see this use (17)
and (19):
γG(v)− λ′G(v) = γˆ≥G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)
γ¯≥G′(v) AG′,G(v) = −γ¯≥G′
Fact 2: For G 6∈ T , bG(v)−AG,D(G)(v) = γˆ≥G(v) for all v.
bG(v) =
{
0 v < r≥G
γˆ≥G(v) v ≥ r≥G
−AG,D(G)(v) =
{
γˆ≥G(v) v < r≥G
0 v ≥ r≥G
Hence for G 6∈ T , bG(v)−AG,D(G)(v) ≥ γG(v)− λ′G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)AG′,G(v) for all v.
For G ∈ S, since γ≥G = γG, and γG(v)−λ′G(v) = γˆG(v). Combining this with Fact 2 above, we
get that bG(v)−AG,D(G)(v) + λ′G(v) = γG(v) for all v.
Finally, for G ∈ T , using Fact 1, for v < r≥G, we get
bG(v) = 0 ≥ γˆ≥G(v) = γG(v)− λ′G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)
AG′,G(v)
which is true for v < r≥G. For v ≥ r≥G, we get
bG(v) = γ≥G(v) = γG(v)− λ′G(v)−
∑
G′∈N−(G)
AG′,G(v),
so the dual constraint is tight when aG(v) > 0 as this starts at r≥G.
The proofs of conditions Appendix D.2–Appendix D.2 are identical as in [FGKK16] using our
slightly modified dual variables:
Claim. Condition (7): For all G and v, aG(v) < 1 =⇒ bG(v) = 0.
Proof. If aG(v) < 1, then v < r≥G, so by construction, bG(v) = 0.
Claim. Condition (8): For all G and v, a′G(v) > 0 =⇒ λG(v) = 0.
Proof. From Subsection 4.2 of [FGKK16], a′G(v) > 0 only for unironed values of v, at which
λG(v) = 0.
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Claim. Condition (9): For all G ∈ G r S,G′ ∈ N−(G) and v, ∫ v0 aG(x)dx < ∫ v0 aG′(x)dx =⇒
αG′,G(v) = 0.
Proof. As discussed at the end of the proof of Lemma 1 of [FGKK16],
∫ v
0 aG(x)dx =
∫ v
0 aG′(x)dx
unless Γ≥G′ is ironed at v, or v ≥ r≥G. In both of these cases αG′,G(v) = 0 (by our fourth fact
about the lower convex envelope and equation Equation (16), respectively).
The above claims prove that this dual solution satisfies feasibility and all complementary slack-
ness and continuity conditions from Section D.2 hold.
E Details from Section 4.1: Construction of a Candidate Dual
Instance
We extend the above examples from Section 4.1 to require any number of menu options. As in the
two examples, we can reason from the top downward that the allocation at the bottom of every
ironed interval must be positive, and reason from the bottom upward that the allocation must
strictly increase for each new overlapping ironed interval we encounter, yielding all different menu
options. We formally define this interleaving structure and call it a “chain,” depicted in Figure 12.
As another sanity check: each new point in the chain induces a new equality that has to be satisfied.
So if the chain is of length M , intuition suggests that we should need M degrees of freedom to
possibly satisfy complementary slackness (but this is just intuition).
Figure 12: This is an example of a chain that consists of the points {(x,A), (y,B)}. It is a top
chain as x > r¯B. Note that (y,B) is preceded by (x,A) as there is flow into B at y and y > xA,
and there is no flow into B for any v ∈ (y, y¯B]. The chain terminates at (y,B) since there is no
flow into A for any v ∈ [y
B
, y
BA
].
Definition 7 (Top chain). A sequence (x1, A), (x2, B), (x3, A), · · · of points that switch between
items A and B is called a chain if the following hold:
• Φλ,αA (x) = 0 for all (x,A) in the chain and Φλ,αB (y) = 0 for all (y,B) in the chain.
• αC,A(x) > 0 for all (x,A) in the chain and αC,B(y) > 0 for all (y,B) in the chain.
• λA(x) > 0 for all (x,A) in the chain and λB(y) > 0 for all (y,B) in the chain.
• xiA < xi+1 < xi if (xi, A) is in the chain and xiB < xi+1 < xi if (xi, B) is in the chain.
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We call a chain the top chain if x1 > rB.
Note that if any of these conditions do not hold, the mechanism has an easier solution. If any
point v in the zero regions of both A and B were unironed, we could just set a price of v for both.
If the chains did not interleave with flow alternating in, our series of constraints would end. The
top chain structure (and it is key that it is a top chain) prevents this.
We now provide a complete proof of Theorem 1. First, we provide a construction of our candi-
date dual, which is depicted in Figure 7. The instance uses definition 7 of a top chain.
Construction of candidate dual instance:
• Let there exist no point at which A and B both have virtual value zero and both are unironed,
that is, there is no v such that Φλ,αA (v) = Φ
λ,α
B (v) = 0 and λA(v) = λB(v) = 0.
• Let rA > x1 > rB > x2 > x3 > · · · > xM > rB > rA. The dual has a top chain of length M
defined by (x1, A), (x2, B), . . . , (xM , A).
• In addition, we have flow into the other item at each point in the chain: let αC,B(xi) > 0 for
all (xi, A) in the chain as well as αC,A(xi) > 0 for all (xi, B) in the chain.
• Let λC(v) = 0 for all v, i.e., item C is unironed everywhere.
• For all v where α has not already been defined, let αC,A(v) = αC,B(v) = 0.
We first make some remarks that follow directly from our construction. All the remarks below
(only) talk about our dual and any feasible primal that satisfies complementary slackness with our
dual.
Remark 1. For all i ∈ {1, 3, · · · ,M − 2}, we have xi, xi+1 ∈ [xiA, xiA] = [xi+1A, xi+1A]. Since this
interval is ironed, we have λA(v) > 0 =⇒ a′A(v) = 0 for v in this interval. Thus, aA(xi) = aA(xi+1).
Remark 2. For all i ∈ {2, 4, · · · ,M − 1}, we have xi, xi+1 ∈ [xiB, xiB] = [xi+1B, xi+1B]. Since
this interval is ironed, we have λB(v) > 0 =⇒ a′B(v) = 0 for v in this interval. Thus, aB(xi) =
aB(xi+1).
Remark 3. For all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, we have uA(xi) = uB(xi).
We now prove a lemma that forms the backbone of our inductive argument:
Lemma 4. For all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M − 1}, we have aA(xi) > aB(xi) ⇐⇒ aA(xi+1) < aB(xi+1).
Similarly, we have aA(xi) < aB(xi) ⇐⇒ aA(xi+1) > aB(xi+1)
Proof. Note that either aA(xi) = aA(xi+1) or aB(xi) = aB(xi+1) by Remark 1 and Remark 2. We
only prove aA(xi) > aB(xi) ⇐⇒ aA(xi+1) < aB(xi+1) for the case aA(xi) = aA(xi+1) and omit
the other (symmetric) cases. Since aA(xi) = aA(xi+1), we have
uA(xi) = uA(xi+1) + aA(xi) · (xi − xi+1) = aA(xi+1) · (xiB − xi+1) + aA(xi) · (xi − xiB).
We also have, by the structure of the ironed intervals for the item B,
uB(xi) = uB(xi+1) + aB(xi+1) · (xiB − xi+1) + aB(xi) · (xi − xiB)
Now, since the utilities at all points xi is the same for both items A and B (Remark 3),
the fact that aA(xi) > aB(xi) is equivalent to aA(xi) · (xi − xiB) > aB(xi) · (xi − xiB) which is
equivalent to aA(xi+1) · (xiB − xi+1) < aB(xi+1) · (xiB − xi+1) which, in turn, is equivalent to
aA(xi+1) < aB(xi+1).
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Finally, we prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. At xM , we have that
uA(xM ) = aA(xM ) · (xM − xMA) and uB(xM ) = aB(xM ) · (xM − xMB).
Since xMB > xMA and aA(xM ) > 0, then to ensure that uA(xM ) = uB(xM ) (Remark 3), we
must have aB(xM ) > aA(xM ). However, with this fact, Lemma 4 says that aB(xi) > aA(xi) and
aB(xi+1) > aA(xi+1) in alternation.
Since aA(·) and aB(·) are non-decreasing sequences, they can only alternate if they have Ω(M)
distinct elements.
By Theorem 2, there exists a feasible primal that satisfies complementary slackness. The primal
algorithm constructs a mechanism with menu complexity at least M and satisfies complementary
slackness, hence this dual is in fact optimal.
Corollary 6. This idea gives a lower bound for Multi-Unit Pricing as well.
We expand on this on Appendix I.
F Menu Complexity is Finite: Characterizing the Optimal Mech-
anism via Duality
In this section, we’ll characterize the optimal mechanism for three items {A,B,C} with structure
A  C, B  C, and A 6 B,B 6 A. While our approach will be algorithmic, our focus isn’t
to actually run this algorithm or analyze its runtime. We’ll merely use the algorithms to deduce
structure of the optimal mechanism. We prove essentially that the interleaving of ironed intervals
used in the construction of the previous section is the worst case (in terms of menu complexity
of the optimal mechanism). Still, in order to possibly prove this, we need to at minimum find an
optimal mechanism for every possible instance.
Our approach is the following: we propose a primal recovery algorithm that, given a dual (λ, α),
produces a primal solution that (1) satisfies complementary slackness with the dual and (2) has
finite menu complexity. Obviously, the algorithm can’t possibly succeed for every input dual (as
some duals are simply not optimal for any instance). But we show that whenever the algorithm
fails, the dual has some strange structure (elaborated below). We then show that the best dual
(which is optimal and always exists, definition below) never admits these strange structures, and
therefore the algorithm always succeeds when given the best dual as input.
Definition 8 (Best Dual). We define the best dual of an instance with three partially-ordered
items to be the (λ, α) satisfying the following:
1. First, (λ, α) is optimal: (λ, α) ∈ arg min{∑G∈{A,B,C} ∫ H0 fG(v) ·max{0,Φλ,αG (v)}dv}.
2. Among (λ, α) satisfying (1), (λ, α) has the fewest ironed intervals of virtual value zero. That
is, (λ, α) minimizes |I(λ, α)| = |{xG | (x,G) ∈ [0, H]× {A,B,C},Φλ,αG (v) = 0}|.
3. Among (λ, α) satisfying (2), (λ, α) has the lowest positives (lexicographically ordered). That
is, (λ, α) minimizes r¯A, followed by r¯B, followed by r¯C .
Definition 9. A double swap exists when there are consecutive points (x,A) and (y,B) in a chain,
and there is flow into A for v ∈ [xA, y). See Figure 13.
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Definition 10. An upper swap occurs when there is flow into (x,A) and (y,B) where x > r¯A >
y > r¯B. See Figure 14.
Proposition 7. The best dual has no double swaps or upper swaps.
The full proof of Proposition 7 appears below. The high-level approach is that whenever a
double swap or upper swap exists, we can exploit this structure to modify the dual variables. This
creates a better dual solution (with respect to definition 8) and proves that (2) or (3) respectively
must not have held for the original dual.
Theorem 2. For any best dual solution, we can find a primal with finite menu complexity that
satisfies complementary slackness (and is therefore optimal).
A full proof appears below, but the high-level approach is explained in the following.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 2. (No bad structures exist in best duals.) First, we try to satisfy the
necessary complementary slackness system of equations as in Appendix E, and identify all possible
barriers to solutions existing. These barriers are exactly double swaps or upper swaps, which are
not found in best duals by Proposition 7.
(Inductive primal recovery algorithm.) Without these barriers, an inductive argument shows
that we can indeed find an allocation rule that satisfies all of the complementary slackness condi-
tions. Every dual has a (possibly empty) top chain, and each point in the chain has another set
of preferability constraints for that item, along with the constraint that the allocation is constant.
We use induction to handle one point in the chain at a time. (See Figure 17 in Appendix F.) We
take the partially-constructed allocation that satisfies the constraints for the chain so far, scale it
down (and thus continue to satisfy the constraints), and then solve for the allocation probability
that will satisfy the new constraints given by this point in the chain. As shown in Appendix E,
this requires choosing a different allocation probability at the bottom of each ironed interval in the
chain, but we show that this is sufficient, giving menu complexity at most the length of the chain
+ 1.
(Finite menu complexity.) The other interesting part not addressed in Appendix E is what to
do if there is a chain of countably infinite length (which can certainly exist). Naively following
our algorithm would indeed result in a primal of countably infinite menu complexity. But, because
the sequence of chain points is monotonically decreasing (and lower bounded by zero), they must
converge to some value v. If they converge, and the chain is indeed infinitely long, then neither A
nor B can possibly be ironed at v, and we can simply set price v for both items instead.
We begin below by reviewing properties of the dual previously observed in Fiat et al. [2016];
Devanur and Weinberg [2017]. Throughout this section we’ll reference the “best” dual. While
multiple optimal duals might exist, we’ll be interested in a specific tie-breaking among them (and
refer to the one that satisfies these conditions as “best”).
Theorem 8 (Devanur and Weinberg [2017]). The best dual (λ, α) satisfies the following:
• (Proper monotonicity) (fG · Φλ,αG )(·) is monotone non-decreasing, for all v.
• (No-boosting) Φλ,αG (v) ≥ 0 for all G such that there exists a G′  G.
• (No-rerouting) Φλ,αG (v) > 0⇒ αG,G′(v) = 0 for all G′.
• (No-splitting) λG(v) > 0⇒ αG,G′(v) = 0 for all G′.
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Returning to our three-item example, prior work nicely characterizes the flow coming out of C in
the optimal dual: No-boosting tells us that we must always send flow out of (v, C) into somewhere
whenever Φλ,αC (v) < 0 (in order to bring it up to 0). No-rerouting tells us that we can never send
flow out of (v, C) if Φλ,αC (v) > 0. No-splitting tells us that we never send flow out of the middle of
an ironed interval. But, we still need to decide whether to send this flow into A or B. This is the
novel part of our analysis.
Proof of Proposition 7. By Definition 8, we know that a best dual has the minimum number of
ironed intervals amongst all optimal duals. Similarly, a best dual has the lowest positives amongst
all optimal duals. We prove the proposition using two lemmas. The first lemma proves that a best
dual can’t have double swaps:
Lemma 5. The optimal dual that has the minimal number of ironed intervals does not contain any
double swaps.
First, we discuss why this structure would cause a problem for how we’re used to satisfying
complementary slackness conditions. Complementary slackness forces that in the ironed intervals
[zB, zB] and [yA, yA], the allocation is constant, and thus utility in these regions is linear. However,
no linear utility functions can satisfy the preferability constraints of having utility that is higher
for item A, then B, then A, as illustrated on the left in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Left: Complementary slackness forces linear utility in ironed intervals. For any choice
of linear utility functions, we cannot satisfy the preferability constraints imposed by the double
swap for item A, then B, then A in this region. The violated constraint corresponds to the circled
arrow. Right: The operation used in the proof of Lemma 5, using a double swap to maintain virtual
welfare and create fewer ironed intervals.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that somewhere in the top chain, some point in the chain
(x,A) is succeeded by (y,B) and αC,A(z) > 0 for some z ∈ (xA, y), creating a double swap. We
consider the following operation (depicted on the right in Figure 13) that pushes flow down within
the ironed interval [xA, xA] and does the reverse on B, yet negates the change in flow at z to
maintain the virtual values below here. Move ε flow from (x,A) to (x,B). Move γ flow from (y,B)
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Figure 14: The operation used in the proof of Lemma 6, using a upper swap to maintain virtual
welfare and create lower positives.
to (y,A). Move α flow from (z,A) to (z,B). We will set
α =
(
x− y
y − z
)
ε and γ =
(
1 +
x− y
y − z
)
ε.
First, this ensures that ε− γ + α = 0, and thus for v ≤ z, Φˆλ,αA (v) = Φλ,αA (v) as well as Φˆλ,αB (v) =
Φλ,αB (v). Second, this ensures that ε(x− z)− γ(y − z) = 0, keeping the average virtual value from
z to x the same for both items.∫ x
z
fA(v)Φˆ
λ,α
A (v)dv =
∫ y
z
fA(v)(Φ
λ,α
A (v) + ε− γ)dv +
∫ x
y
fA(v)(Φ
λ,α
A (v)− γ)dv
=
∫ x
z
fA(v)Φ
λ,α
A (v)dv + ε(x− z)− γ(y − z)
=
∫ x
z
fA(v)Φ
λ,α
A (v)dv
However, the virtual values in [y, x] are increasing for item A and decreasing for item B, and
likewise those in [z, x) are decreasing for item A and increasing for item B. If we choose ε small
enough as to not uniron the interval [xA, x¯A], the change gets spread around the interval and the
interval remains all zeroes. However, for item B, the interval [y
B
, y¯B] becomes positive while the
region above becomes negative. Since the average of both regions is the same and there is now a
non-monotonicity, the regions will be ironed together, creating a larger ironed interval with virtual
value zero.
Since the virtual welfare of the dual hasn’t changed, but we have reduced the number of ironed
intervals, then we did not start with an optimal dual with the fewest possible ironed intervals,
deriving a contradiction.
The second lemma proves that a best dual can’t have upper swaps:
Lemma 6. The optimal dual that has the lowest positives does not contain any upper swaps.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose an upper swap exists. Then (as depicted on the right in
Figure 14) we can push up α flow from (y,B) to (x,B), causing fB(v)Φˆ
λ,α
B (v) = fB(v)Φ
λ,α
B (v)− α
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for v ∈ [y, x] and improving virtual welfare by α(x − y). To leave the flow out of item C un-
changed, we balance this out by pushing α flow down from (x,A) to (y,A), causing fA(v)Φˆ
λ,α
A (v) =
fA(v)Φ
λ,α
A (v) + α for v ∈ [y, x].
If y is unironed at A, that is, y¯A = y, or if y¯A < r¯A, then by choosing α = −fA(y¯A)Φλ,αA (y¯A),
this will cause ˆ¯rA = y¯A, lowering the positives.
Alternatively, if y is ironed up to r¯A such that y¯A = r¯A, then we can choose a very small α to
keep the interval [y
A
, r¯A] ironed, making the whole interval positive and causing ˆ¯rA = yA, lowering
the positives. The dual will only increase by α(x− y), even when the values are ironed around, as
ironing preserves virtual welfare. This is canceled out by the improvement in virtual welfare from
item B. Then we have maintained virtual welfare but lowered the positives, showing that this dual
solution could not have had the lowest positives.
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 comprise the proof of Proposition 7.
Now we prove that our primal recovery algorithm always succeeds in finding an optimal primal
(that satisfies complementary slackness) when given a best dual.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, consider the case where there exists some point v where Φλ,αA (v) =
Φλ,αB (v) = 0, and v is unironed both in A and in B. Then we simply set v as a price for both
A and B, automatically satisfying the complementary slackness conditions of flow into A or B,
as both are equally preferable. Since both items A and B, have the same allocation rule, the
instance degenerates into a FedEx instance. Thus, an optimal allocation rule for the item C can
be determined.
Otherwise, the dual solution contains no point v as described in the first case, meaning that
ironed intervals interleave throughout the region of zero virtual values. This means that, if without
loss of generality r¯A > r¯B, that r¯B = x must sit in an ironed interval [xA, x¯A] on A.
If the top chain is empty, then we have r¯A > r¯B > xA with no flow into A for any v ∈ [xA, x¯A].
Then, setting
aA(v) =

1 v ≥ x¯A
r¯A−r¯B
r¯A−xA v ∈ [xA, x¯A)
0 otherwise
and aB(v) =
{
1 v ≥ r¯B
0 otherwise
makes both options equally preferable for all v except for v ∈ [xA, x¯A], where reporting B is strictly
preferable, but this does not violate complementary slackness by the assumption that the top chain
is empty.
Otherwise, the top chain is non-empty. A dual gives a system of utility inequalities via comple-
mentary slackness which the allocation rule must satisfy. Instead, we can solve a system of utility
equalities given by the chain via induction on the length of the top chain, and this will imply a
solution that satisfies all of the inequalities. More specifically, the following will hold for top chains
of all lengths:
1. The allocation rule will only increase at the bottom of ironed intervals in the chain. That is,
if the allocation rule increases at z, so a′A(z) > 0, then z must be the bottom of an ironed
interval for a point (x,A) in the top chain, thus z = xA, and aA(x) = aA(xA).
2. We will fully allocate to all positive virtual values. That is, aA(r¯A) = aB(r¯B) = 1.
3. If (x,A) is followed by (y,B) in the chain, then aA(x) = aA(xA) > aB(y) = aB(yB).
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4. At any point (x,A) in the top chain, we will have uA(x) = uB(x).
5. An alternative solution can, for the first point in the chain (x,A), vary aA(xA) such that the
utility constraint is a strict inequality uA(x) > uB(x), and instead we have equality at r¯A:
uA(r¯A) = uB(r¯A). This gives an equal expected price for the two items, and equal utility for
all values v ≥ r¯A.
To satisfy complementary slackness, for any type (x,A) with flow in, it must be that uA(x) ≥
uB(x). We now show why (3-4) imply that complementary slackness will be satisfied everywhere.
Consider a subsequence of points in the chain: (x,B), (y,A), (z,B), hence y > xB and z > yA.
Then aB(x) > aA(y) > aB(z) by (3). Since uA = uB for every point in the chain and a larger
allocation rule implies a larger change in utility, we can deduce that uA(v) ≥ uB(v) for all v ∈ [z, y].
• For v ∈ (y
A
, xB), we have that aA(v) > aB(v), and since uA(z) = uB(z), then uA(v) ≥ uB(v)
in this region.
• For v ∈ (xB, y), we have that aB(v) > aA(v), and since uA(y) = uB(y), then uA(v) ≥ uB(v)
in this region.
• By definition of a double swap, there is no v ∈ [y
A
, z) such that there is flow into (v,A).
Likewise, there is no v ∈ [xB, y) such that there is flow into (v,B).
Hence all possible complementary slackness conditions are satisfied.
Figure 15: Left: A candidate dual (with no double or upper swaps); part of a chain. Right: An
allocation that satisfies complementary slackness up to value y, satisfying equal preferability at z
and y and preferability at all points with flow in.
We now show that these sufficient properties hold by induction. As a base case, consider when
there is one point in the top chain, which without loss is (x,A). By definition of the top chain,
r¯A > x > r¯B > xA and there is flow into item A at x, which is in ironed interval [xA, x¯A]. We can
set aA(xA) =
x−r¯B
x−xA and set aA(r¯A) = aB(r¯B) = 1. Then
uA(x) = aA(xA) · (x− xA) =
x− r¯B
x− xA
· (x− xA) = 1(x− r¯B) = uB(x).
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Figure 16: Left: The base case of a candidate dual with an empty chain. Right: An allocation that
satisfies complementary slackness.
Then conditions (1-4) are met. To satisfy (5), we can instead set aA(xA) =
r¯A−r¯B
r¯A−xA . Then
uA(r¯A) = aA(xA) · (r¯A − xA) =
r¯A − r¯B
r¯A − xA
· (r¯A − xA) = 1(r¯A − r¯B) = uB(r¯A).
For the inductive hypothesis, suppose for any chain of length n, we have allocation rules such
that (1-5) hold.
Now consider a chain of length n+ 1. Without loss of generality, let (x,A) be the top point in
the chain, where x sits in the ironed interval [xA, x¯A], and this point is proceeded by (y,B) which
sits in [y
B
, y¯B], hence r¯A > x > r¯B and y > xA by definition of the chain.
By the inductive hypothesis, we can come up with allocation rules aA(·) and aB(·) that satisfy
complementary slackness to the same chain without the highest point (x,A), and will have aA(xA) =
aB(r¯B) = 1. We construct an allocation rule aˆ for the top chain of size n + 1 as follows; this is
depicted in Figure 17. Let λ = x−r¯Bx−y−aB(yB)(r¯B−y)
< 1. Then let
aˆA(v) =
{
1 v ≥ r¯A
λaA(v) otherwise
and aˆB(v) =
{
1 v ≥ r¯B
λaB(v) otherwise.
This clearly satisfies (1-3). To show that (4) holds, we observe that at any previous point of
concern v < r¯B, we had uA(v) = uB(v). Now at those points, we have uˆA(v) =
∫ v
0 aˆA(v)dv =
λ
∫ v
0 aA(v)dv = λuA(v). This holds for uˆB(v) = λuB(v) as well. Thus, complementary slackness is
still satisfied at all previous points v ≤ r¯B; we only need to check equal utility at x.
uˆA(x) = uˆA(y) + aˆA(xA)(x− y) = λuA(y) + λ · 1 · (x− y)
uˆB(x) = uˆB(y) + aˆB(yB)(r¯B − y) + aˆB(r¯B)(x− r¯B) = λuB(y) + λ · aB(yB)(r¯B − y) + 1 · (x− r¯B)
Then to have uˆA(x) = uˆB(x), since uA(y) = uB(y), we require that
λ(x− y) = λ · aB(yB)(r¯B − y) + 1 · (x− r¯B).
The solution here is exactly the λ defined above.
Alternatively, by replacing x with r¯A, thus setting λ =
r¯A−r¯B
r¯A−y−aB(yB)(r¯B−y)
, we get a solution
that has uA(x) > uB(x) and uA(r¯A) = uB(r¯A) as required in (5).
Thus we have ensured that for top chains of all lengths, we can give an allocation rule that
satisfies complementary slackness for all values from the bottom to the top of the chain. For v
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below the chain, uB(v) = uA(v) = 0, so we automatically satisfy complementary slackness. Above
the chain, if we have used the alternate solution that (5) guarantees exists, we automatically
satisfy complementary slackness for v ≥ r¯A. This would only fail if there is flow into item B for
v ∈ [x, r¯A)—that is, if the dual contains a upper swap, but by assumption it does not. Then for
any dual solution with no double swaps or upper swaps, this algorithm gives an allocation rule that
satisfies complementary slackness.
We prove that the menu complexity of the mechanism output by this algorithm is finite below:
Claim. The menu complexity is always finite.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an instance such that the mechanism
output by the algorithm has infinite menu complexity.
Note that this can only happen if the length of the top chain is infinity. Thus, there exists a
sequence of points (x1, A), (x2, B), (x3, A), · · · such that the point (xi, A) is inside an ironed interval
[xiA, xiA] and xi+1 ≥ xiA. Analogous claims hold for an element (xi+1, B) in the chain.
Thus, we have
x1 ≥ rB ≥ x2B ≥ x2 ≥ x1A ≥ x3A ≥ x3 ≥ · · ·
Since the infinite sequence x1, x2, · · · is monotone and bounded, it converges to a limit, say
x∗. Observe that x∗ satisfies Φλ,αA (x
∗) = Φλ,αB (x
∗) = 0 and is unironed. This is because points
arbitrarily close to it are unironed and are zeroes of Φλ,αA (·) and Φλ,αB (·). However, in this case, our
algorithm just sets the price x∗ and thus has constant menu complexity, a contradiction.
G Equivalence with Single-Minded Valuations
In the introduction, we note the following observation.
Observation 2. The partially-ordered setting is equivalent to the single-minded setting.
First, we define the single-minded setting.
Definition 11. In a single-minded setting, a seller determines how to sell any bundle of k items.
A buyer has a (value, bundle) pair (v,B) where B ∈ 2[k] is any subset of items. The pair (v,B)
is drawn from a joint probability distribution over [0, H] × 2[k] where H is the maximum possible
value of any bidder for any item.
Any single-minded setting can be represented as a partially-ordered setting: the set of possible
interests G is just the set of possible bundles, 2[k]. The relation is set containment: an interest G
dominates an interest G′, that is, G  G′, if G ⊃ G′. The distribution F is identical.
Any partially-ordered setting can be represented as a single-minded setting: we can invent items
such that every interest G maps to some subset of items. For any minimal interest G (that is, G
which does not dominate any other interests), map G to a new item i: B(G) = {i}. For each
successive interest G′ ∈ N+(G), map G′ to B(G′) = {j} ∪⋃G′′:G′∈N+(G′′)B(G′′) where j is a new
additional item. Repeat this process, completing a mapping from interests to subsets of some m
created items. For all subsets B ∈ 2[k] which do not have an interest that maps onto it, assign
measure 0 to the event of drawing (v,B) from F . Otherwise, fB(G)(v) = fG(v).
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Figure 17: Top Left: A top chain from a candidate dual. We use the inductive hypothesis on the
chain of one size smaller (below the green line). Top Right: The allocation rule from the inductive
hypothesis that satisfies all CS constraints on the smaller chain (below the green line). Bottom
Left: The scaled allocation rule, requiring preferability of A between the green lines. Bottom Right:
The allocation rule that satisfies these preferability constraints.
H The Master Theorem
All of the analysis in the previous section started from a candidate dual solution, and showed that
such duals are optimal (as in, there is a feasible primal satisfying complementary slackness). The
missing step is ensuring that there exists an input distribution for which these duals are feasible.
To save ourselves (and future work) the tedium of hand-crafting an actual distribution for which
these duals are feasible, we prove a general Master Theorem, essentially stating that for a wide
class of duals (essentially, anything dictated by ironed intervals, positive/negative regions, and flow
in), there exists a distribution for which this dual is feasible.
Theorem 9 (Master Theorem). Suppose we are given a partial order over G, for each item G ∈ G
candidate endpoints of zero region (bounded away from 0) r¯G, rG, a finite set of candidate ironed
intervals (bounded away from zero) [xi,G, xi,G] with rG ≤ xi,G ≤ xi,G ≤ r¯G, and for each pair of
items G′  G a finite set of candidate flow-exchanging points (bounded away from zero) yi,G,G′ not
in (xi,G, xi,G] for any candidate ironed interval. Then there exists a joint distribution over (value,
interest) pairs with a feasible dual (λ, α) such that:
• the endpoints of the zero region for Φλ,αG are rG and r¯G.
• the ironed intervals of Φλ,αG are exactly to the intervals [xi,G, xi,G] (no others).
45
• αG,G′(y) > 0⇔ y = yi,G,G′ for some i.
Note that from the proof the Master Theorem, it is clear how to explicitly construct a distri-
bution for the lower bound (although this is a tedious and unilluminating process).
In this section we provide a complete proof of Theorem 9. On our way to prove this theorem, we
generalize a result of Saxena et al. [2018], in which they show that for totally ordered preferences,
one can always find a discrete distribution that produces a well-enough-behaved revenue curve.
They use this result to show that there exist instances for which the menu complexity is the worst
possible, exponential in the number of items. Here we extend their construction and show that for
any well-enough-behaved set of continuous revenue curves for the partially ordered setting, there
exist distributions that induce them.
The first step is to generalize the result of Saxena et al. [2018] from discrete distributions to
continuous distributions.
Lemma 7 (Revenue Theorem for Continuous Curves). Given a continuous curve R : [1, H] differ-
entiable everywhere except at countably many points, such that R(1) = 1 and |R′(x)+|, |R′(x)−| ≤
1
2H∀x ∈ [1, H], there exists a distribution F such that R is the revenue curve that arises from selling
to a single bidder with a valuation drawn from F .
Proof. Consider the following distribution
F (x) = 1− R(x)
x
, x ∈ [1, H]
and F (x) = 0 for x ≤ 1, F (x) = 1 for x ≥ H. In order to show that this is a valid distribution, it
suffices to show that it is monotonic non-decreasing. For that, we consider its derivative and show
it is non-negative everywhere:
F ′(x) =
−xR′(x) +R(x)
x2
.
It suffices to show that the numerator, R(x) − R′(x)x, is always non-negative. Note that for
x ≥ 1, R(x) ≥ 12 (since R(1) = 1 and the derivative doesn’t change fast enough) and |R′(x)+| ≤ 12H .
Since x ≤ H, the claim follows.
It remains to show that indeed the revenue from this distribution matches the curve R(x).
Consider setting a price of x, then the revenue of selling at x is exactly x(1− F (x)) = R(x).
Now we want to extend this to say we can find distributions for revenue curves with specific
properties that will be useful.
Theorem 10 (Master Theorem for Single Item). Given candidate endpoints of zero region x+, x−
and candidate ironed interval endpoints [xi, xi]
k
i=1 (where x− ≤ xi ≤ xi ≤ x+) there is a distribution
F such that the revenue curve induced by a bidder whose valuation is drawn from F satisfies
• Φλ,α(x)f(x) is negative for x < x− (i.e. x− is the lower endpoint of the zero region),
• Φλ,α(x)f(x) is positive for x > x+ (i.e. x+ is the upper endpoint of the zero region) and,
• the ironed intervals correspond exactly to the intervals [xi, xi] for i = 1 to k.
Proof. We will reduce the problem of finding a valid distribution to that of constructing a revenue
curve that will guarantee these properties and then apply Lemma 7. Consider the following revenue
curve:
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R(x) =

x 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
1 + x2H 1 ≤ x ≤ x−,
1 + x−2H x− ≤ x ≤ x1
1 +
x−+x1−x
2H x1 ≤ x ≤ x1+x12
1 + x−+x−x12H
x1+x1
2 ≤ x ≤ x1
. . .
1 + x−2H xi−1 ≤ x ≤ xi
1 +
x−+xi−x
2H xi ≤ x ≤ xi+xi2
1 + x−+x−xi2H
xi+xi
2 ≤ x ≤ xi
. . .
1 + x−2H xk ≤ x ≤ x+
1 + x−2H − x−x+2H(H−x+)(x− + 1) x+ ≤ x ≤ H.
This revenue curve is such that R(1) = 1 and |R′(x)| ≤ 12H for x ∈ [1, H]. This allows us
to claim that there is a distribution that induces this revenue curve. Moreover, from the way we
constructed this revenue curve, the derivative is positive from 0 to x−, negative from x+ to H,
goes from negative to positive for the intervals [xi, xi] and is 0 elsewhere. We will show that these
conditions are sufficient to make the virtual values take the signs we intend them to.
It suffices to note that the sign of the derivative of the revenue at x is the opposite of the sign
of the virtual value at x (noted in Definition 1). By construction, our revenue curve has negative
slope on values higher than x+ and positive slope on points below x−. The intervals in between
will be ironed and turn into 0 slope intervals.
Remark 4. It is possible to relax the condition that all ironed intervals are between x−, x+. It
is not hard to see how to adapt the proof to have ironed intervals either in [1, x−] or [x+, H]. It
is sufficient to add dimpled intervals, like the ones in our construction, as the revenue curve is
increasing or decreasing. We don’t need them for our main result, hence don’t worry about this
more general result. Likewise, the revenue curve R could be made differentiable everywhere if we
used a smoother function to transition between the ironed and non-ironed intervals, as opposed to
straight lines.
Proof of Theorem 9. If the constraint over flows wasn’t there, the problem would be a direct ap-
plication of Theorem 10. Unfortunately, the flow constraints may affect the virtual values of
neighboring items. It is not hard to predict how outgoing and incoming flow will change the virtual
values for the different items. From the study of duality in this context we know that if there is
ε-flow leaving from (yi, G) to (yi, G
′) (where G′ ∈ N+(G)), then the virtual values of all points
of item G with y ≤ yi will increase by ε and all points of item G′ with y ≤ yi will decrease by
ε. Thus, given that we know what we want the revenue curves to look like after all flow has been
sent, we can reverse engineer what they must look like in order to make that happen. In particular,
since the flows shift the virtual values by a constant it will suffice to subtract a function whose
value is 0 before yi and becomes a line with small, negative slope at xi (say, slope ε =
1
2H
) from
the “suggested” (by Theorem 10) revenue curve for item G (since these will increase by ε after
the flow is sent) and add positive slope functions of the same value at xi on item Gi,G from its
suggested revenue curve (since these will decrease by ε after the flow is sent). This is sufficient
because of the connection between virtual values and revenue curves argued before: the derivative
corresponds to changes in the virtual value. So for a constant change in virtual value, the matching
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change would be adding a linear term to the revenue curve of opposite sign. The order in which
we do these changes is by processing items from leaves to the root (i.e. only process a node once
all its children have been processed) and within an item G, address the flow-exchange values from
smallest to largest.
We abuse this opportunity to prove a similar result for the multi-unit pricing setting.
Theorem 11 (Master Theorem for MUP). Suppose we are given a MUP instance where the buyer
can get up to n copies of an item. Let Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n be the item corresponding to i copies. For
each item Gi we are given candidate endpoints of the zero region x−i, x+i and a set of candidate
ironed interval endpoints [xj,i, xj,i]
ki
j=1 with x−i ≤ xj,i ≤ xj,i ≤ x+i. Moreover, for each tuple
(i, i + 1) and (i, i − 1), we are given a set of candidate flow-exchanging points yj,i,i+1 and yj,i,i−1
not in (xj,i, xj,i] for any candidate ironed interval. Then, there exists distributions FG for all items
G such that:
• the endpoints of the zero region for Gi correspond to x−i, x+i,
• the ironed intervals correspond exactly to the intervals [xj,i, xj,i]kij=1 (and no other),
• the dual of the problem is such that there αGi,Gi+1(yj,i,i+1) ≥ 0 (i.e. there is flow sent from
Gi at yi to Gi+1 into yj,i,i+1 and no other flow from i to i+ 1).
• the dual of the problem is such that there αGi,Gi−1(yj,i,i−1) ≥ 0 (i.e. there is flow sent from
Gi at yi to Gi−1 into i−1i yj,i,i−1 and no other flow from i to i− 1).
Proof. This proof is similar to that of 9 with the exception that on the former, increasing the flow
from (v,G) to (v,G′) (with G′ ∈ N+(G)) by a little bit increases and decreases the virtual values
below v by the same amount. This is no longer true since we are moving from (yj,i,i−1, Gi) to
( i−1i yj,i,i−1, Gi−1). In this case, sending ε flow from (yj,i,i−1, Gi) to (
i−1
i yj,i,i−1, Gi−1) increases the
virtual values below (yj,i,i−1, Gi) by ε but decreases the ones on the other end by only i−1i ε. So,
in order to reverse engineer the change in virtual value induced by this setting we need to add
the same functions as in the proof of Theorem 9 to the revenue curve suggested for Gi and add a
i
i−1 -scaled version of it for the receiving item at the point (
i−1
i yj,i,i−1, Gi−1) on the revenue curve
for Gi−1. The order in which these we do these changes is by processing items from leaves to root
(i.e. from Gn to G1) and within a item Gi, address the flow-exchange points from smallest to
largest.
I A Candidate Dual for a Lower Bound on Menu-Complexity for
the Multi-Unit Pricing Problem
Consider an MUP instance where the buyer can get one, two, or three copies of a given item. The
relevant complementary slackness constraints in this setting go from
• Rightwards. For all v, from (v, 1)→ (v, 2) and (v, 2)→ (v, 3). This is because a buyer can
always misreport and get more items.
• Leftwards. For all v, from (v, 2)→ (v/2, 1) and (v, 3)→ (2v/3, 2). This is because a buyer
would prefer getting fewer items if they are available for much cheaper.
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As shown in [DHP17], a buyer of type (v, C)’s utility for reporting (v/2, A) is given by uA(v/2) =∫ v/2
0 aA(x)dx. The same buyer’s utility for reporting (v,B) is given by uB(v) = 2
∫ v
0 aB(x)dx.
To construct a lower bound for the MUP instance, we adapt our construction from the partially
ordered case. We describe our construction formally below, but note here all the relevant differences.
Observe that the incentive compatibility constraints for the MUP instance described above hide a
partially ordered instance inside them. Indeed, the ‘item’ 2 is analogous to the item C, while the
items A and B are the items 1 and 3 respectively. Just like the partially ordered instance, there
are incentive compatibility constraints from (v, 2)→ (v, 3) for all v. The only difference is that the
constraints from (v, 2)→ (v, 1) have been replaced by those from (v, 2)→ (v/2, 1). Also, there are
‘new’ constraints from (v, 1)→ (v, 2) and (v, 3)→ (2v/3, 2).
We claim that, despite these changes, the essence of our argument there still holds. Roughly
speaking, our argument there involved constructing a top-chain (see Definition 7) oscillating be-
tween items A and B. For any value x in this chain, we had flow coming from C to both A and B.
Reasoning about complementary slackness constraints, then, gave us our lower bound.
For the MUP case, we can still do all the above things with the caveat that the value (v/2, 1)
has to be treated as if it were (v, 1). An analogous master theorem can still be proved as the
effect of the ‘diagonal’ flow on the virtual values is predictable. Using the master theorem, we can
construct (essentially) any dual we want. Thus, we can have a feasible dual with a top-chain of an
arbitrary length M oscillating between items 1 and 3. Also, we have flow from the item 2 to both
1 and 3 at all values in this top-chain. Chasing through the complementary slackness constraints
in this dual again gives us a lower bound.
To highlight this analogy, in what follows, we use C instead of 2, A instead of 1, and B instead
of 3.
Formally, we construct given an integer M > 0, a dual containing a top chain among A and B
of length M . That is, a sequence of points (x1, A), (x2, B), . . . , (xM , A) such that
xM/2A < xM−1B/2 < · · · < x2B/2 < x1/2A.
In this dual, we have no extra space between the ironed intervals:
• rA = xMA/2, rA = x1A/2, and for i such that (xi, A) and (xi+2, A) are in the chain, xi/2A =
xi+2/2A.
• rB = xMB, rB = x2B, and for i such that (xi, B) and (xi+2, B) are in the chain, xiB = xi+2B.
Recall that by definition of the · and · operators, (xG, xG] is ironed in G. Also by our definitions,
fG(v)Φ
λ,α
G (v) > 0 for v ≥ r¯G; fG(v)Φλ,αG (v) = 0 for v ∈ [rG, r¯G]; fG(v)Φλ,αG (v) < 0 for v ≤ rG.
We will also define C to be DMR (and thus have no ironed intervals) with rC = 2rA and
r¯C = 2r¯A.
We adapt the flow from the partially ordered lower bound example: for any (x,G) in the chain,
αC,A(x→ x/2) > 0 and αC,B(x→ x) > 0.
Theorem 12. To satisfy complementary slackness with the candidate dual, the allocation requires
M distinct allocation probabilities; the menu complexity is at least M .
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 1. Using the constraint that the allocation
can’t increase in the middle of an ironed interval and that uA(x/2) = uB(x) for all (x,G) in the
chain, we show that the allocations must be non-zero throughout the chain.
Then, we show that for consecutive points in a chain (xi, A), (xi+1, B) that (1/2)aA(xi/2) >
2aB(xi+1), and similarly, for (xi, B), (xi+1, A), that 2aB(xi) > (1/2)aA(xi+1/2)
This is enough to show that all of the menu options must be distinct, requiring meu complexity
≥M .
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Figure 18: The analogue of the partially ordered candidate dual, adjusted for the Multi-Unit Pricing
problem.
J Coordinated Valuations
In this section and the following Appendix K, we examine the same minimal partial ordering with
G = {A,B,C} where A  C,B  C,A 6 B,B 6 C. However, a type (v, C) now has a function
gA(v) and gB(v) describe his valuations for A and B respectively, and gC(v) = v. That is, if a buyer
with type (v, C) gets item G, his utility is gG(v) times the probability that he is served minus his
payment.
The main result is that even for gA that is piecewise linear with only two segments and for
gB(v) = v, the randomization required in the optimal mechanism jumps from unbounded but
finite, as it was in the partially-ordered setting, to countably infinite. This further fills out the
spectrum, placing this setting between partially-ordered items and two additive items.
However, if gA and gB are not piecewise linear, the menu complexity once again jumps up,
becoming uncountably infinite, and matching the menu complexity for two additive items.
J.1 Preliminaries
Consider selling 3 items A, B, and C to one bidder. Define the set Items = {A,B,C}. We use G¯ to
refer to a general item ∈ Items. When we make claims about G¯, we mean that the claim holds for
each of the three items in Items. When referring only to items A, B, we use the symbol G. Thus,
a claim that holds for G holds for both A and B.
In the setting we consider, the bidder has a type in the set Types = {A,B,C} × [0, H], where
H ∈ R is some constant. The type (G¯, v) of the bidder is drawn from a distribution f supported
on Types. Denote by qG¯ =
∫ H
0 f(G¯, t)dt. Also, define fG¯(v) =
1
qG¯
∫ v
0 f(G¯, t)dt as the distribution f
conditioned on q = G¯. Almost exclusively, we refer to f as (q, fG¯). We also omit the subscript when
it is clear from context.
We now define the bidder’s value function v : Types× Items→ [0, H]. This is defined as
v(C, v, G¯) = gG¯(v) and v(G, v, G¯) = v · 1G=G¯,
where gG : [0, H] → [0, H] is an increasing, invertible function that is Lipschitz with parameter L
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and gC(v) = v for all v ∈ [0, H]. Intuitively, this means that if the bidder has type (C, v), then
their value for item G¯ is gG¯(v). A bidder with type (G, v) has the value 0 for any item G¯ 6= G and
value v for the item G.
Mechanisms. A mechanism is defined by two functions a, p, where a : Types → [0, 1] and
p : Types → [0, H]. The function a is called the allocation rule and the function p is called the
payment rule. We will use aG¯(v) to denote a(G¯, v) and pG¯(v) to denote p(G¯, v). A mechanism is
said to be incentive compatible if, for all t = (G¯, v), t′ = (G¯′, v′) ∈ Types
v(t, G¯)a(t)− p(t) ≥ v(t, G¯′)a(t′)− p(t′) (20)
Instance. An instance I for the coordinated items setting is defined by a tuple (q, fG¯, gG¯). We
will usually omit the subscript and simply write (q, f, g). Our goal is find, for a given instance I,
the incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes the revenue Et∼(q,f)[p(t)].
J.1.1 A Linear Programming Formulation
For an instance I for the coordinated items , finding the incentive compatible mechanism that
maximizes Et∼(q,f)[p(t)] turns out to be equivalent to the linear program in Equation 21. Here
and throughout, for a distribution f supported on [0, H], we use ϕ(v) = v − 1−F (v)f(v) to denote the
Myerson’s virtual value function, where F (v) =
∫ v
0 f(t)dt is the cumulative distribution function
for the distribution defined by f .
maximize P(a) =
∑
G¯
∫ H
0
qG¯fG¯(t)aG¯(t)ϕG¯(t)dt (21a)
subject to∫ gG(v)
0
aG(t)dt−
∫ v
0
aC(t)dt ≤ 0 ,∀v (21b)
−a′¯G(v) ≤ 0 ,∀v (21c)
0 ≤ aG¯(v) ≤ 1 ,∀v (21d)
aG¯(0) = 0 (21e)
Even though the argument that Equation 21 is equivalent to finding the incentive compatible
mechanism that maximizes Et∼(q,f)[p(t)] is standard, we summarize it here. Observe that the
non-trivial incentive compatibility constraints in Equation 20 can be classified into two types:
• t = (G¯, v) and t′ = (G¯, v′): In this case, Equation 20 reduces to vaG¯(v)− pG¯(v) ≥ vaG¯(v′)−
pG¯(v
′). This is attainable for all v, v′ if and only if the allocation rule aG¯ is monotone
increasing (Equation 21c) and pG¯(v) = vaG¯(v)−
∫ v
0 aG¯(t)dt.
• t = (C, v) and t′ = (G, v′): In this case, Equation 20 reduces to vaC(v) − pC(v) ≥
gG(v)aG(v
′) − pG(v′). Due to the constraints in the previous paragraph, it is sufficient to
have vaC(v) − pC(v) ≥ gG(v)aG(gG(v)) − pG(gG(v)). This is equivalent to the constraint in
Equation 21b.
Finally, it can be verified that if pG¯(v) = vaG¯(v)−
∫ v
0 aG¯(t)dt, then Et∼(q,f)[p(t)] = P(a).
We will use p = (aG¯) to denote a general solution to Equation 21 and P(I) to denote the
optimal value for the instance I.
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J.1.2 A Lagrangian Dual Formulation
For any instance I of coordinated items , the revenue maximization problem is defined in Equa-
tion 21. Let X ⊂ [0, H] be a discrete set of points in [0, H]. Define the X-dual of Equation 21
as:
minimize DX(λ, γ,Γ) =
∑
G¯
∫ H
0
qG¯fG¯(t) max
(
0,Φλ,γ,Γ,X
G¯
(t)
)
dt (22a)
subject to
λG¯(H) = 0 (22b)
λG¯(v), γG(v),ΓG(x) ≥ 0 , ∀x ∈ X, v ∈ [0, H] (22c)
where
Φλ,γ,Γ,X
G¯
(v) = ϕG¯(v) +
1
qG¯fG¯(v)
−λ′¯G(v)− ∑
X3x>g−1
G¯
(v)
ΓG¯(x)−
∫ H
g−1
G¯
(v)
γG¯(s)ds

Equation 22 is obtained from Equation 21 by Lagrangifying the constraints Equation 21c using
the variables λG¯(v), the constraints Equation 21b using the variables γG(v), and the constraints
Equation 21b, for v ∈ X using the variables ΓG(v). Here and throughout this paper, we define
γC(v) = −γA(v) − γB(v) and ΓC(v) = −ΓA(v) − ΓB(v) for notational ease. We note that getting
Equation 22 from Equation 21 requires integrating a certain term by parts. Throughout this work,
we assume that our functions are well-behaved enough to allow such standard operations.
Note that the idea of using a Lagrangian dual is not new to this work. Indeed, a lot of recent
advances in similar settings have been made using this technique. We will use d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) to
denote a general solution to Equation 22 and DX(I) to denote the optimal value for the instance
I. Often, we will abbreviate Φλ,γ,Γ,X
G¯
(v) to Φd,X
G¯
(v) or even Φ(v) if the subscript and superscript
are clear from the context.
We have the following ‘strong duality’ result (proof in Appendix K.1):
Theorem 13 (Strong Duality). Let I be an instance of coordinated items .
(a) Let X ⊂ [0, H] be a discrete set. For any feasible solution p = (aG¯) of Equation 21 and any
feasible solution d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) of the X-dual (Equation 22), it holds that:
P(p) ≤ DX(d).
Equality holds if and only if the following conditions are satisfied almost everywhere:
∀v : ΦdG¯(v) > 0 =⇒ aG¯(v) = 1. (23a)
∀v : ΦdG¯(v) < 0 =⇒ aG¯(v) = 0. (23b)
∀v : λG¯(v) > 0 =⇒ a′¯G(v) = 0. (23c)
∀v : γG(v) > 0 =⇒
∫ v
0
aC(t)dt =
∫ gG(v)
0
aG(t)dt. (23d)
∀x ∈ X : ΓG(x) > 0 =⇒
∫ x
0
aC(t)dt =
∫ gG(x)
0
aG(t)dt. (23e)
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(b) There exists a set X such that P(I) = DX(I).
The main reason we provide a proof for this ‘strong duality’ result is that the variables are
parametrized by a continuous variable. We could not find any results for such variables that
subsume our setting. Our proof of Theorem 13 works by showing, for all  > 0, a discrete linear
program that has almost the same primal and dual value (up to terms depending on
√
). Since
strong duality holds for discrete systems, this gives us that the duality gap of our linear program
is small. Theorem 13 then follows as the feasible region is closed.
J.1.3 Our Framework
Fix an instance I and discrete set X ⊆ [0, H].
The Dual Framework. Let d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) be a feasible solution for the X-dual, i.e., Equa-
tion 22. Define
rG¯(d) = inf{v | Φd,XG¯ (v) = 0} rG¯(d) = sup{v | Φ
d,X
G¯
(v) = 0}.
If the inf (resp. sup) is over an empty set, we define it to be H (resp. 0).
We sometimes refer to γ and Γ as representing flow, e.g., we say that there is flow from (C, v)
to A if γA(v) > 0 or ΓA(v) > 0.
An interval [y, y] ⊆ [0, H] is said to be ironed on a item G¯ if λG¯(y) = λG¯(y) = 0 and for all
v ∈ (y, y), we have λG¯(v) > 0.
The Primal Framework. Let p = (aG¯) be a feasible primal solution for Equation 21. Let
Y = [y, y] ⊆ [0, H] be an interval. Define MCG¯(Y, p) = |{α | ∃v ∈ Y : aG¯(v) = α}| to be the
number of distinct values taken by the function aG¯ over the interval Y . Also, define MC(Y, p) =
maxG¯∈ItemsMCG¯(Y, p). We omit the argument Y if it is [0, H].
We define the menu complexity of the instance I, MC(I) = minp:P(p)=P(I) MC(p) to be the
smallest menu complexity of any optimal solution to Equation 21.
J.1.4 Formal Statements of our Results
Theorem 14. There exists an instance Uncountable of coordinated items such that MC(Uncountable)
is uncountably infinite. Furthermore, the instance Uncountable satisfies gB(v) = v and all the dis-
tributions fG¯ are DMR
15.
Theorem 15. For any instance I such that the functions gG are piecewise linear, we have MC(I)
is at most countably infinite.
Theorem 16. There exists an instance Countable1 of coordinated items such that MC(Countable1)
is countably infinite. Furthermore, the instance Countable1 satisfies gB(v) = v and all the distri-
butions fG¯ are DMR, and the function gA is piecewise linear.
Theorem 17. There exists an instance Countable2 of coordinated items such that MC(Countable2)
is countably infinite. Furthermore, the instance Countable2 satisfies gB(v) = v and the function
gA is piecewise linear with only 2 segments.
15Recall that a distribution is DMR if the Myerson’s virtual value function is non-decreasing.
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J.2 Master Theorem
For our lower bounds, we will construct instances that have a large menu complexity. To show
a lower bound on the menu complexity, we will define a feasible solution to the X-dual (Equa-
tion 22), for some X, show that it is optimal, and then show that any feasible primal that satisfies
complementary slackness (Equation 23) with this dual must have a large menu complexity. Below,
we prove a ‘Master Theorem’ (Theorem 18) (proof in Appendix K.2) that constructs instances
together with a feasible dual solution with some desirable properties.
Theorem 18 (Master Theorem). Let H > 0 be fixed. Suppose that, for all G¯ ∈ Items, points
ρ
G¯
< ρG¯ ∈ [1, H] are given. Let XA, XB be discrete subsets of [ρC , ρC ]. Consider finite or infinite
sequences of disjoint intervals
YG = {(yG,i, yG,i)}i≥0 ZG = {(zG,i, zG,i)}i≥0
where y
G,i
, yG,i ∈ [ρG, ρG] and zG,i, zG,i ∈ [ρC , ρC ]. Then, for any invertible functions g′G : [0, H]→
[0, H], there exists an instance I = (q, fG¯, gG) and an (XA ∪XB)-dual d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) such that
the following hold:
• gG(v) = g′G(v) for all v ∈ [0, H].
• The value of Φd,XA∪XB
G¯
(v)fG¯(v) is non-decreasing and rG¯(d) = ρG¯ and rG¯(d) = ρG¯.
• λC(v) = 0 throughout and λG(v) > 0 ⇐⇒ v ∈ (yG,i, yG,i) for some i.
• γG(v) > 0 ⇐⇒ v ∈ (zG,i, zG,i) for some i.
• ΓG(v) > 0 ⇐⇒ v ∈ XG for some i.
Moreover, if YG is empty, then the distributions fG¯ are DMR.
J.3 Lower Bounds
J.3.1 DMR Distributions
Let a : [0, H] → [0, 1] be a non-decreasing function that is continuous except at countably many
points. In this subsection, we construct an instance I = (q, f, g) of coordinated items such any
optimal solution of Equation 21 for I satisfies that aA = a16. In our construction, the distributions
fG¯ are DMR and gB(v) = v.
Two important instantiations of this general procedure prove Theorem 14 and Theorem 16.
For Theorem 14, we construct Uncountable by setting need a(v) = v/H. For Theorem 16, we
construct Countable1 by setting a to be a function that takes countably many values. A concrete
example of such a function is one that has countably many “steps” as it moves from 0 to 1. We
take care that the function gA is piecewise linear in Countable1.
16We abuse notation slightly here. What is meant is that aA takes the same values over the interval [2, H + 2] as
a takes over the interval [0, H] (see section J.3.1 for the exact statement).
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The Instance For notational convenience, we work in the range [0, H + 3] in this subsubsection.
Consider an increasing function a : [0, H]→ [0, 1] and let A(v) = ∫ v0 a(t)dt. Let ρ = H+2−A(H) ∈
[2, H + 2]. Note that A−1(v) is well defined for v > 0 and define:
g′A(v) =

v , 0 ≤ v ≤ 1
v−1
ρ−1 + 1 , 1 < v ≤ ρ
A−1 (v − ρ) + 2 , ρ < v ≤ H + 2
v ,H + 2 < v ≤ H + 3
.
It is readily seen seen that g′A satisfies A(H) − A (g′A(v)− 2)) = H − (v − 2) in the interval
(ρ,H + 2]. Let g′B(v) = v and apply Theorem 18 with g
′
G and
• ρ
A
= 2, ρA = H + 2, ρB = ρB = ρ, ρC = 1, ρC = H + 2.
• XG,YG are empty
• ZG(v) = {(ρ,H + 2)}.
This gives an instance I = (q, f, g) and an (XA ∪XB)-dual solution d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) such that
the distributions fG¯ are DMR and :
• For all v, gG(v) = g′G(v) and rG¯ = ρG¯ and rG¯ = ρG¯.
• λG¯(v),ΓG(v) are 0 throughout.
• γG(v) > 0 ⇐⇒ v ∈ (ρ,H + 2).
The Analysis Recall a, ρ, and I constructed above. Define a feasible primal solution p∗ = (a∗¯
G
)
of Equation 21 for I as:
a∗A(v) =

0 , 0 ≤ v ≤ 2
a(v − 2) , 2 < v ≤ H + 2
1 , H + 2 < v ≤ H + 3
a∗B(v) = a
∗
C(v) =
{
0 , 0 ≤ v ≤ ρ
1 , ρ < v ≤ H + 3
In Lemma 8 (proof in Appendix K.3), we show that p∗ and d satisfy complementary slackness.
To finish our menu complexity lower bound, we argue that any primal p = (aG¯) that satisfies
complementary slackness with d must have aA = a
∗
A. This proof is in Lemma 9.
Together with strong duality (Theorem 13), Lemma 8 shows that d is optimal. Thus, any
optimal primal for I must satisfy complementary slackness with d. Lemma 9 says that aA = a∗A
for this primal and thus, it has a high menu complexity.
Lemma 8. The primal p∗ is feasible and p∗, d satisfy complementary slackness (Equation 23).
Lemma 9. Consider any feasible primal p = (aG¯) that satisfies complementary slackness with d
must aA = a
∗
A, where a
∗
A is the allocation for item A in p
∗.
Proof. We reason from Equation 23. Specifically, the constraints (23a), (23b) for item B imply
that aB(v) = 0 for v ∈ [0, ρ) and aB(v) = 1 for v ∈ (ρ,H + 3]. Thus, we have:∫ gB(v)
0
aB(t)dt = (v − ρ)1v≥ρ.
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Since γG(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (ρ,H + 2), we have by (23d) that
∫ gA(v)
0 aA(t)dt =
∫ gB(v)
0 aB(t)dt =∫ v
0 aC(t)dt for all v in this range. Thus, for all v ∈ (ρ,H + 2):∫ gA(v)
0
aA(t)dt = v − ρ.
Since the right hand side in the equation above is independent of the primal, we get for all
v ∈ (ρ,H+2) that ∫ gA(v)0 aA(t)dt = ∫ gA(v)0 a∗A(t)dt. Thus, for all v ∈ (2, H+2), we have ∫ v0 aA(t)dt =∫ v
0 a
∗
A(t)dt implying aA(v) = a
∗
A(v) in this range. The constraints (23a), (23b) for item A fix the
allocation aA outside (2, H + 2). Combining, we get that aA = a
∗
A.
J.3.2 Proof of Theorem 17
In the last subsection, we showed that instances can have high menu complexity, even when all the
distributions fG¯ are DMR. The reason for high menu complexity is the complexity in the functions
gG. We now show that if the distributions fG¯ are not required to be DMR, even ‘simple’ (e.g.,
piecewise linear with only 2 segments) functions gG can have countably infinite menu complexity.
Two segments are required because of the arguments in Appendix F. This is tight due to our upper
bounds in subsection J.4.
The Instance Countable2 For notational convenience, we work in the range [0, H + 1] in this
subsubsection. Define:
g′A(v)17 =

v , 0 ≤ v ≤ 1
v+1
2 , 1 < v ≤ 2H/3 + 1
2V −H − 1 , 2H/3 + 1 < v ≤ H + 1
g′B(v) = v
We define points x1 =
4H
5 + 1, y1 =
3H
4 + 1, and xi =
8
3
H
2i
+ 1 , yi =
8
5
H
2i
+ 1 for i > 1. Note
that the sequence xi converges to x = 1.
In order to construct Countable2, we apply Theorem 18 with g
′
G and
• ρ
A
= g′A(x), ρA = g
′
A(x2), ρB = g
′
B(x), ρB = g
′
B(x1), ρC = x, ρC = x1.
• YA = {(g′A(x2i+2), g′A(x2i))} for some i > 0. YB = {(g′B(x2i+1), g′B(x2i−1))} for some i > 0.
• ZG is empty and XG = {yi}i>0.
This gives an instance Countable2 = (q, f, g) and an (XA ∪ XB)-dual solution d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG)
such that :
• For all v, gG(v) = g′G(v) and rG¯ = ρG¯ and rG¯ = ρG¯.
• λC(v), γG(v) are 0 throughout. λA(v) > 0 if and only if v ∈ (gA(x2i+2), gA(x2i)) for some
i > 0 and λB(v) > 0 if and only if v ∈ (gB(x2i+1), gB(x2i−1)) for some i > 0.
• ∀i > 0 : ΓG(yi) > 0.
17Note that this function is piecewise linear with 3 segments and not 2. However, the first segment is just for
notational ease and can be removed.
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The Analysis Recall the definitions of xi, yi and the instance Countable2 above. Define a feasible
primal solution p = (a∗¯
G
) of Equation 21 for Countable2 as:
a∗A(v) =

0 , 0 ≤ v ≤ gA(x)
40
13·4i , gA(x2i+2) ≤ v < gA(x2i)
1 , gA(x2) ≤ v ≤ H + 1
a∗B(v) =

0 , 0 ≤ v ≤ gB(x)
40
13·4i , gB(x2i+1) ≤ v < gB(x2i−1)
1 , gB(x1) ≤ v ≤ H + 1
a∗C(v) =

0 , 0 ≤ v ≤ x
20
13·2i , yi+1 ≤ v < yi
1 , y1 ≤ v ≤ H + 1
We proceed exactly as in subsubsection J.3.1. In Lemma 10 (proof in Appendix K.4), we show
that p and d satisfy complementary slackness. To finish our menu complexity lower bound, we argue
that any primal that satisfies complementary slackness with d must have infinite menu complexity.
Together with strong duality (Theorem 13), Lemma 10 shows that d is optimal. Thus, any
optimal primal for Countable2 must satisfy complementary slackness with d. Lemma 11 says that
such a primal has infinite menu complexity
Lemma 10. There primal p is feasible for Countable2 and p,d satisfy complementary slackness.
Lemma 11. Any feasible primal p for Countable2 with a finite menu complexity does not satisfy
complementary slackness with d.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Let p = (aG¯) be a feasible primal with finite menu complexity that
satisfies complementary slackness with d.
Let i∗ be the largest i such that aA(gA(yi)) > aA(gA(yi+1)) or aB(gB(yi)) > aB(gB(yi+1)). If no
such i∗ exists, we define i∗ = 0. Since MC(p) is assumed to be finite and the allocation is monotone
(by constraint (21c)), i∗ is well defined and aA(gA(yi)) and aB(gB(yi)) is constant for all i > i∗.
Let the constant values be piA and piB respectively.
Since p, d satisfy Equation 23, we have, by Equation 23c
aG(v) = piG ,∀v ∈ (gG(x), gG(yi∗+1)] (24)
Also, for all i > 0 we have by the constraint (23e) (applied once to both yi and yi+1)∫ gA(yi)
gA(yi+1)
aA(t)dt =
∫ yi
yi+1
aC(t)dt =
∫ gB(yi)
gB(yi+1)
aB(t)dt (25)
We derive a contradiction in two steps. First, we prove
Claim. piA = 2piB.
Proof. Consider an i larger than i∗ + 10. Using Equation 24 and Equation 25, we get
piA (gA(yi)− gA(yi+1)) = piB (gB(yi)− gB(yi+1))
piA (yi − yi+1) = 2piB (yi − yi+1) (Definition of gA)
piA = 2piB.
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Claim. aA(gA(y2)) 6= 2aB(gB(y2)).
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that aA(gA(y2)) = 2aB(gB(y2)) = 2pi. By Equation 23a,
we have aA(gA(v)) = 1 for all v > x2. Since y2, y1 are in the same ironed interval on B and y2, x2
are in the same ironed interval on A, we have using Equation 25 that
gA(y1)− gA(x2) + 2pi (gA(x2)− gA(y2)) = pi (gB(y1)− gB(y2)) .
Plugging in the values of y1, x2, y2, we have
H
2
− H
3
+ 2pi
(
H
3
− H
5
)
= pi
(
3H
4
− 2H
5
)
,
a contradiction to pi < 1.
These two claims together with Equation 24 establish that i∗ > 1. We now give a contradiction
assuming i∗ is even. A similar argument works if i∗ is odd. Since gA(yi∗), gA(yi∗+1) lie in the
same ironed interval in A, we have aA(gA(yi∗)) = aA(gA(yi∗+1)) = piA. By choice of i
∗, we have
pi′B = aB(gB(yi∗)) > piB. By Equation 25, we have
piA
2
(yi∗ − yi∗+1) = piA(gA(yi∗)− gA(yi∗+1)) = pi′B(yi∗ −xi∗+1) +piB(xi∗+1− yi∗+1) > piB(yi∗ − yi∗+1),
a contradiction to Equation J.3.2.
J.4 Upper bounds
In this subsection, we prove that for any instance I such that the functions gA(·) and gB(·) are
piecewise linear, we have MC(I) is at most countably infinite (Theorem 15). This result is tight by
our arguments in subsection J.3
Our line of argument is as follows: Fix an instance I. By Theorem 13, there exists an X,
a primal solution p = (aG¯) and an X-dual solution d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) that satisfy complementary
slackness. From p, d, we construct another primal solution pˆ such that MC(pˆ) is small and pˆ, d
satisfy complementary slackness. Thus, the primal pˆ also defines an optimal revenue mechanism.
The menu complexity of this new mechanism gives us our upper bound on MC(I).
We note that this technique is markedly different from that employed in Appendix F where we
assume an optimal dual and describe a recovery algorithm that reads an optimal primal from the
optimal dual. Here, we assume both, an optimal dual and an optimal primal18, and prove that such
a primal can be improved to have a lower menu complexity.
J.4.1 Splitting
Our procedure to improve the primal makes extensive use of the following “splitting” operation:
Definition 12. Let a : R → R be a function and consider the interval s = [x, y], where x, y ∈ R.
Define the function a ◦ s as :
a ◦ s(v) =
{
a(v) , v 6∈ s
1
y−x
∫ y
x a(t)dt , v ∈ s
18Note that we need Theorem 13 to assume that there exists an optimal primal-dual pair that satisfies complemen-
tary slackness.
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The following is easily observed for all v /∈ s:∫ v
−∞
a ◦ s(t)dt =
∫ v
−∞
a(t)dt (26)
If s1 and s2 are two disjoint intervals, then a◦ s1 ◦ s2 = a◦ s2 ◦ s1. We will use a◦ s1s2 to denote
this common value.
Remark 5. Let a be a function and s be an interval. For any x, y, z ∈ s, we have∫ z
−∞
a ◦ s(t)dt = 1
y − x
[
(y − z)
∫ x
−∞
a(t)dt+ (z − x)
∫ y
−∞
a(t)dt
]
.
Lemma 12. Let a be an increasing function and s be an interval. We have
∫ z
−∞ a(t)dt ≤
∫ z
−∞ a ◦
s(t)dt. Moreover, equality holds if v 6∈ s or a is constant over the interval s.
Proof. Let s = [x, y]. Since a is increasing, we have∫ y
x
a(t)dt ≥
∫ z
x
a(t)dt+
y − z
z − x
∫ z
x
a(t)dt =
y − x
z − x
∫ z
x
a(t)dt.
Rearranging gives the result. The moreover part can be using Equation 26 and Definition 12.
J.4.2 Proof of Theorem 15
Fix an instance I and let p, d, be an optimal primal dual pair (d is X-dual for some X). Without
loss of generality, we can assume that the product Φd,X
G¯
(v)fG¯(v) is non-decreasing (see Appendix A).
We define the function sgn(x) to be 1 if x > 0, 0 if x = 0, and −1 if x < 0. Using d, define the
following notion of a strip.
Definition 13 (Strip). A strip s is an interval [x, y], where x, y ∈ [0, H], such that the following
hold:
• For all G¯, there functions gG¯ are linear over s
• For all G¯, the function sgn
(
Φd,X
G¯
(gG¯(v))fG¯(gG¯(v))
)
is constant for v ∈ s.
• For all G¯, the function sgn (λG¯(gG¯(v))) is constant for v ∈ s.
The following holds for any strip.
Lemma 13. For I, p, d as above, let s be any strip. There exists another primal solution pˆ of I
such that
• aˆG¯(gG¯(v)) = aG¯(gG¯(v)) for all v 6∈ s.
• pˆ, d satisfy complementary slackness (Equation 23).
• For all G¯, it holds that MCG¯ ([gG¯(x), gG¯(y)], aˆG¯) ≤ 10.
The proof of this lemma spans the rest of this subsection.
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Proof. Let s = [x, y]. Define the function uG¯(v) =
∫ gG¯(v)
0 aG¯(t)dt
19. Since the functions gG¯ are con-
tinuous, and aG¯ is continuous except at countably many points, we have that uG¯ is also continuous.
Define points z, z as follows20:
z = inf
v∈[x,y]
{v | uA(v) = uB(v)} z = sup
v∈[x,y]
{v | uA(v) = uB(v)}.
We use z and z to define:
aˆG = aG ◦ [gG(x), gG(z)][gG(z), gG(z)][gG(z), gG(y)].
uˆG(v) =
∫ gG(v)
0
aˆG(t)dt.
Now, define:
z1 = inf
v∈[x,z]
{v | max(uˆA(v), uˆB(v)) = uC(v)} z2 = sup
v∈[x,z]
{v | max(uˆA(v), uˆB(v)) = uC(v)}.
z3 = inf
v∈[z,z]
{v | max(uˆA(v), uˆB(v)) = uC(v)} z4 = sup
v∈[z,z]
{v | max(uˆA(v), uˆB(v)) = uC(v)}.
z5 = inf
v∈[z,y]
{v | max(uˆA(v), uˆB(v)) = uC(v)} z6 = sup
v∈[z,y]
{v | max(uˆA(v), uˆB(v)) = uC(v)}.
Finally, we define:
aˆC = aC ◦ [x, z1][z1, z2][z2, z][z, z3][z3, z4][z4, z][z, z5][z5, z6][z6, y].
uˆC(v) =
∫ v
0
aˆC(t)dt.
Our primal pˆ is defined by the allocations (aˆG¯). Note that item 1 and item 3 are straightforward
from Definition 12. We only concentrate on item 2.
For item 2, we verify each of the constraints in Equation 23. For Equation 23a, observe that
if ΦG¯(gG¯(v)) > 0 for some v ∈ s and some G¯, then, since s is a strip, ΦG¯(gG¯(v)) > 0 throughout
s. Thus, the allocation aG¯ is 1 throughout s and our operations have no effect. If v /∈ s, then the
result follows as p, d satisfied complementary slackness. A similar argument verifies Equation 23b
and Equation 23c.
For Equation 23d, consider a v,G such that γG(v) > 0. If v 6∈ s, then the result follows because
of 5 and the fact that p, d satisfy complementary slackness. If v ∈ s, then, since p, d satisfied
complementary slackness, we have uG(v) = uC(v). Thus, by Lemma 12, uˆG ≥ uC(v) implying that
v ∈ [z1, z2] ∪ [z3, z4] ∪ [z5, z6]. Suppose that v ∈ [z1, z2]. The other cases are similar. We have:
uˆG(v) =
uˆG(z1)(gG(z2)− gG(v)) + uˆG(z2)(gG(v)− gG(z1))
gG(z2)− gG(z1) ( 5)
=
uˆG(z1)(z2 − v) + uˆG(z2)(v − z1)
z2 − z1 (gG(v) = mGv + cG over a strip)
=
uˆC(z1)(z2 − v) + uˆC(z2)(v − z1)
z2 − z1 (Definition of z1, z2)
= uˆC(v) ( 5)
19Note that this is just the utility of a bidder with type (G¯, gG¯(v)).
20Throughout this subsection, we define several infimums and supremums. In case the argument to any of these
is empty, we simply drop those terms from where they are used. For example, if z, z are not defined, we simply use
aG ◦ [gG(x), gG(y)] instead of aG ◦ [gG(x), gG(z)][gG(z), gG(z)][gG(z), gG(y)] below.
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Equation 23e is verified similarly.
Proof of Theorem 15. Since the functions gG are assumed to be piecewise linear, we can partition
the range [0, H] into countably many disjoint strips. Theorem 15 follows by applying Lemma 13 to
each of the strips.
K Missing Proofs From Appendix J
K.1 The Proof of Theorem 13
K.1.1 The Proof of item (a)
Proof. Fix X ⊂ [0, H]. Observe that :
DX(d) =
∑
G¯
∫ H
0
qG¯fG¯(t) max (0,ΦG¯(t)) dt ≥
∑
G¯
∫ H
0
qG¯fG¯(t)ΦG¯(t)aG¯(t)dt
Using the definition of Φ, we get
DX(d) ≥ P(p) +
∑
G¯
∫ H
0
aG¯(t)
−λ′¯G(t)− ∑
X3x>g−1
G¯
(t)
ΓG¯(x)−
∫ H
g−1
G¯
(t)
γG¯(s)ds
 dt
First, note that, integrating by parts, we have
∑
G¯
∫ H
0 aG¯(t)λ
′¯
G
(t)dt = −∑G¯ ∫ H0 a′¯G(t)λG¯(t)dt ≤ 0
by Equation 21c. Fix any v ∈ [0, H]. Grouping all the terms with γG(v), we observe that γG(v) is
multiplied by
∫ v
0 aC(t)dt−
∫ gG(v)
0 aG(t)dt ≥ 0 by Equation 21b. Similarly, fix any x ∈ X. Grouping
all the terms with ΓG(x), we observe that ΓG(x) is multiplied by
∫ x
0 aC(t)dt −
∫ gG(x)
0 aG(t)dt ≥ 0
by Equation 21b.
Thus, we have DX(d) ≥ P(p). To finish the proof, observe that the conditions in Equation 23
are exactly those needed to make these inequalities tight.
K.1.2 The Proof of item (b)
Proof. We prove that for all  > 0, there is a set X such that P(I) ≥ DX(I)− . The statement
then follows because the the union of the region in Equation 22 for all possible sets X is closed.
Recall that the functions gG are L-Lipschitz.
Fix  > 0 and let δ > 0 be sufficiently small. Our proof proceeds by defining a discrete linear
program (Equation 27) and its dual (Equation 28) for I, δ. Let the optimal value of Equation 27
be Pδ(I) and the optimal value of Equation 28 be Dδ(I). Since strong duality holds for discrete
linear programs, we have Pδ(I) = Dδ(I). We also ensure that Dδ(I) = Pδ(I) ≤ H for all δ.
In Theorem 19, we show that P(I) ≥ (1 − √δ)Pδ(I) − L
√
δ. In Theorem 20, we show that
there is a set Xδ such that DXδ(I) ≤ Dδ(I). Combining, we get
P(I) ≥ (1−
√
δ)Pδ(I)− L
√
δ = (1−
√
δ)Dδ(I)− L
√
δ ≥ (1−
√
δ)DXδ(I)− L
√
δ > DXδ(I)− ,
for small enough δ.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to defining and analyzing the discrete linear program, in
order to prove Theorem 19 and Theorem 20.
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K.1.3 The Discrete Linear Program
We describe a discrete linear program for the instance I. The instance I is fixed for the rest of this
subsection. Without loss of generality, let δ > 0 be such that H/δ = H ′ is an integer.
The Primal Consider the following optimization problem with the variables aG¯(i) and pG¯(i)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ H ′. In this subsection, we abuse notation and write gG¯(i) instead of gG¯(iδ). Define∫ gG¯(i)
gG¯(i−1) fG¯(v)dv = fˆG¯(i) and fˆG¯(0) = 0.
maximize Pδ(a) =
∑
G¯
H′∑
i=1
qG¯fˆG¯(i)pG¯(i) (27a)
subject to
gC(i)aC(i)− pC(i) ≥ gG(i)aG(i)− pG(i) , ∀i (27b)
gG¯(i)aG¯(i)− pG¯(i) ≥ gG¯(i)aG¯(i+ 1)− pG¯(i+ 1) , ∀i (27c)
gG¯(i)aG¯(i)− pG¯(i) ≥ gG¯(i)aG¯(i− 1)− pG¯(i− 1) , ∀i (27d)
pG¯(0) = aG¯(0) = 0 (27e)
aG¯(i) ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i (27f)
It is easy to see why Pδ(I) ≤ H. We also have:
Theorem 19. The optimal value Pδ(I) of Equation 27 satisfies (1−
√
δ)Pδ(I) ≤ P(I) + L
√
δ.
Proof. Let η =
√
δ and (aG¯, pG¯) be the optimal solution for Equation 27. Consider the set T =
{(Gj , aj , pj) | ∃i, Gj : aGj (i) = aj , (1−η)pGj (i) = pj}. Using the set T , we now define a mechanism
M for the continuous revenue optimization problem. Consider a type t = (G¯, v) ∈ Types. Define:
(Gt, at, pt) = arg max(Gj ,aj ,pj)∈T v(t, Gj)aj − pj .
Let M be the mechanism that allocates item Gt with probability at and charges price pt to a bidder
who reports t21. Observe that M is a truthful mechanism. By a standard argument, there exists a
feasible solution p to Equation 21 such that P(I) ≥ P(p) = Et∼(q,f)[pt] is the expected revenue of
M . We now prove that Et∼(q,f)[pt] ≥ (1− η)Pδ(I)− Lη.
Couple a bidder in M with (continuous) type t = (G¯, v) with a bidder with (discrete) type (G¯, i)
where i is the smallest value such that gG¯(i) > v . The coupling is valid as
∫ gG¯(i)
gG¯(i−1) fG¯(v)dv = fˆG¯(i).
We show that pt ≥ (1− η)pG¯(i)− Lη. Taking the expectation on both sides gives the result.
Observe that:
v(t, Gt)at − pt ≥ vaG¯(i)− (1− η)pG¯(i)
gG¯(i)aG¯(i)− pG¯(i) ≥ v(G¯, gG¯(i), Gt)at −
pt
1− η
Adding, we get that
v(G¯, v,Gt)at + gG¯(i)aG¯(i) +
ηpt
1− η ≥ vaG¯(i) + ηpG¯(i) + v(G¯, gG¯(i), Gt)at
21We slightly deviate from our definition of a mechanism and allow Gt to be different from G¯.
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Since at, aG¯(i) ∈ [0, 1], we have
pt ≥ (1− η)pG¯(i) +
1− η
η
(
(v − gG¯(i))aG¯(i) +
(
v(G¯, gG¯(i), Gt)− v(G¯, v,Gt)
)
at
)
≥ (1− η)pG¯(i) +
1
η
(gG¯(i− 1)− gG¯(i)) aG¯(i) (gG¯(i) > v ≥ gG¯(i− 1))
≥ (1− η)pG¯(i)− Lη (gG¯ is L-Lipschitz)
The Dual Consider the following Lagrangian relaxation of Equation 27, where we Lagrangify
the constraints Equation 27b using the variables ΓG(i), the constraints Equation 27c using the
variables λ+G(i), and the constraints Equation 27d using the variables λ
−
G(i). We use the convention
that ΓC(i) = −ΓA(i)− ΓB(i)
minimize Dδ(I)(λ,Γ) =
∑
G¯
H′∑
i=1
qG¯fˆG¯(i) max
(
0,Φλ,Γ
G¯
(i)
)
(28a)
subject to
λ+
G¯
(i) + λ−
G¯
(i)− ΓG¯(i) = qG¯fˆG¯(i) + λ+G¯(i− 1) + λ−G¯(i+ 1) , ∀i (28b)
λ+
G¯
(i), λ−
G¯
(i) ≥ 0 , ∀i (28c)
γG(i) ≥ 0 , ∀i (28d)
where terms like λ+G¯(H + 1) are defined to be 0 and
Φλ,γ
G¯
(i) =
(
gG¯(i)−
1
qG¯fˆG¯(i)
(
λ+
G¯
(i− 1) (gG¯(i− 1)− gG¯(i)) + λ−G¯(i+ 1) (gG¯(i+ 1)− gG¯(i))
))
Theorem 20. The optimal value Dδ(I) of Equation 28 satisfies Dδ(I) ≥ DX(I) where X = {iδ |
i ∈ Z ∩ [0, H ′]}.
Proof. We proceed by defining a feasible solution of Equation 22 from the optimal solution of
Equation 28 with the same value. Throughout this proof, we denote the variables of the discrete
linear program using a ‘hat’. Let (λˆ+
G¯
, λˆ−
G¯
, ΓˆG) be the optimal solution to Equation 28. Define
FˆG¯(v) =
∑
i:gG¯(i)<v
fˆG¯(i). Define an X-dual solution d = (λG¯, γG,ΓG) for I as follows
λG¯(v) = vqG¯(FG¯(v)− FˆG¯(v)) + (v − gG¯(i))λ+G¯(i) + (gG¯(i+ 1)− v)
gG¯(i)− gG¯(i− 1)
gG¯(i+ 1)− gG¯(i)
λ+
G¯
(i− 1)
γG(v) = 0
ΓG(iδ) = ΓˆG(i)
where i is the largest integer such that gG¯(i) < v. Observe that d is feasible and
qG¯fG¯(v)Φ
d,X
G¯
(v) = −qG¯
gG¯(i+ 1)
(
1− FˆG¯(v)
)
− gG¯(i)
(
1 + fˆG¯(i)− FˆG¯(v)
)
gG¯(i+ 1)− gG¯(i)
− λ+
G¯
(i) +
gG¯(i)− gG¯(i− 1)
gG¯(i+ 1)− gG¯(i)
λ+
G¯
(i− 1)−
H/∑
j=i+1
ΓG¯(j)
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Since Φd,X
G¯
(v) is constant in [gG¯(i), gG¯(i+ 1)], we have:∫ gG¯(i+1)
gG¯(i)
qG¯fG¯(t) max
(
0,Φd,X
G¯
(t)
)
dt = max
(
0,
∫ gG¯(i+1)
gG¯(i)
qG¯fG¯(t)Φ
d,X
G¯
(t)dt
)
But,∫ gG¯(i+1)
gG¯(i)
qG¯fG¯(t)Φ
d,X
G¯
(t)dt
= gG¯(i)qG¯fˆG¯(i)− λ+G¯(i− 1) (gG¯(i− 1)− gG¯(i))−
∫ gG¯(i+1)
gG¯(i)
λ+
G¯
(i) + qG¯
(
1− FˆG¯(t)
)
+
H′∑
j=i+1
ΓG¯(j)
 dt
= gG¯(i)qG¯fˆG¯(i)− λ+G¯(i− 1) (gG¯(i− 1)− gG¯(i))− λ−G¯(i+ 1) (gG¯(i+ 1)− gG¯(i)) (Equation 28b)
= qG¯fˆG¯(i)Φˆ
λˆ,Γˆ
G¯
(i)
Thus,
∫ gG¯(i+1)
gG¯(i)
qG¯fG¯(t) max
(
0,Φd,X
G¯
(t)
)
dt = qG¯fˆG¯(i) max
(
0, Φˆλˆ,Γˆ
G¯
(i)
)
. Summing over i, G¯, we get
that Dδ(I) = DX(d) ≥ DX(I).
K.2 Proof of Theorem 18
We need the following technical lemma:
Lemma 14. Let H > 1 and R(x) : [1, H] → R be a function such that R(1) = 1 and for all
x, y ∈ [1, H] such that x < y, we have −y−x2H < R(y)−R(x) < y−x2H . Then, there exists a distribution
F supported on [0, H] such that
x(1− F (x)) =
{
x , 0 ≤ x < 1
R(x) , 1 ≤ x ≤ H .
Proof. Define:
F (x) =

0 , 0 ≤ x < 1
1− R(x)x , 1 ≤ x < H
1 , x = H
.
Observe that F satisfies the requirements of the theorem. To prove that F is a valid distribution,
it is sufficient to show F (x) < F (y) for all x < y. We first note that 1 − R(x)x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the
only case left is when x, y ∈ [1, H]. In this case,
xy (F (y)− F (x)) = yR(x)− xR(y) = yR(x)− xR(x) + x(R(x)−R(y))
> yR(x)− xR(x)− xy − x
2H
= (y − x)
(
R(x)− x
2H
)
= (y − x)
(
R(x)− 1 + 2H − x
2H
)
> (y − x)
(
R(x)−R(1) + x− 1
2H
)
> 0.
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Proof of Theorem 18. Let I = (q, fG¯, gG) be such that qG¯ = 13 and gG(v) = g′G(v) for all v. In
order to define fG¯, define
QG¯(v) =

1 + v−1100H , 1 ≤ v < ρG
1 +
ρ
G
−1
100H , ρG ≤ v < ρG
1 +
ρG+ρG−1−v
100H , ρG ≤ v ≤ H
ΛG(v) =
1
100H2
∑
i
min
(
(v − y
G,i
)(v − yG,i), 0
)
Let ΛC(v) = 0 throughout. Also, define:
ZG,i(v) =

1
4i
, v < zG,i
1
4i
zG,i−v
zG,i−zG,i , v ∈ [zG,i, zG,i]
0 , v > zG,i
YG,i(v) =
{
1
4i
, v < xG,i
0 , v > xG,i
P1,G(v) =
1
100H
∑
i
ZG,i(v) P2,G(v) =
1
100H
∑
i
YG,i(v)
Finally, define P1,C(v) = −P1,A(v)− P1,B(v) and P2,C(v) = −P2,A(v)− P2,B(v) and ,
RG¯(v) = QG¯(v) +
1
qG¯
[
ΛG¯(v)−
∫ v
1
P1,G¯(g
−1
G¯
(t))dt−
∫ v
1
P2,G¯(g
−1
G¯
(t))dt
]
Observe that the function RG¯ satisfies all the requirements of Lemma 14. Thus, there exist
distributions fG¯ such that
x(1− FG¯(x)) =
{
x , 0 ≤ x < 1
RG¯(x) , 1 ≤ x ≤ H
.
Set λG¯ = −ΛG¯, γG(v) = −P ′1,G(v) and ΓG(·) : XG → R to be the unique function such that∑
x>v Γ(x) = P2,G(v).
Observe that the dual defined by (λG¯, γG,ΓG) satisfies all the requirements of the theorem.
K.3 Omitted Proofs in subsubsection J.3.1
Proof of Lemma 8. We verify each of the constraints in Equation 23 and leave verifying feasibility
using Equation 21 to the reader. The constraints (23a), (23b) are verified easily. The constraint
(23c) is true because λG(v) = 0 throughout. The constraint (23d) holds because for all v ∈
(ρ,H + 2), we have ∫ v
0
a∗C(t)dt = v − ρ∫ gB(v)
0
a∗B(t)dt =
∫ v
0
a∗B(t)dt = v − ρ∫ gA(v)
0
a∗A(t)dt =
∫ gA(v)
2
a(t− 2)dt =
∫ gA(v)−2
0
a(t)dt = A(gA(v)− 2) = v − ρ.
and the three quantities are equal. Finally, the constraint (23e) is satisfied because Γ is zero
throughout.
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K.4 Omitted Proofs in subsubsection J.3.2
Recall that x1 =
4H
5 + 1, y1 =
3H
4 + 1, and xi =
8
3
H
2i
+ 1 , yi =
8
5
H
2i
+ 1 for i > 1. This implies the
equations
∀i > 1 : xi − yi = 16H
15 · 2i . (29a)
∀i > 1 : yi − xi+1 = 4H
15 · 2i . (29b)
∀i > 1 : 1
2
(xi+1 − yi+1) + 2 (yi − xi+1) = (yi − yi+1) (29c)
5y2 + 16y1 = 21x2. (29d)
We will need the following lemma:
Lemma 15. For all i > 0 and v ∈ [yi+1, yi],∫ gG(v)
gG(yi+1)
a∗G(x)dx ≤
∫ v
yi+1
a∗C(x)dx.
Moreover, equality holds if v = yi.
Proof. We calculate the three quantities:
∫ gA(v)
gA(yi+1)
a∗A(t)dt =

10
13 (gA(v)− gA(y2)) , i = 1, v ≤ x2
10
13 (gA(x2)− gA(y2)) + (gA(v)− gA(x2)) , i = 1, v > x2
40
13·2i (gA(v)− gA(yi+1)) , i is even
40
13·2i+1 (gA(v)− gA(yi+1)) , i is odd, v ≤ xi+1
40
13·2i+1 (gA(xi+1)− gA(yi+1)) + 4013·2i−1 (gA(v)− gA(xi+1)) , i is odd, v > xi+1
∫ gB(v)
gB(yi+1)
a∗B(t)dt =

40
13·2i+2 (v − yi+1) , i is even, v ≤ xi+1
40
13·2i+2 (xi+1 − yi+1) + 4013·2i (v − xi+1) , i is even, v > xi+1
40
13·2i+1 (v − yi+1) , i is odd∫ v
yi+1
a∗C(t)dt =
20
13 · 2i (v − yi+1)
We now prove the result for i = 1. In this case, as the expressions for B and C are the same, it is
sufficient to show that∫ gA(v)
gA(yi+1)
a∗A(t)dt =
{
5
13 (v − y2) , v ≤ x2
5
13 (x2 − y2) + 2v − 2x2 , v > x2
=
{
5
13 (v − y2) , v ≤ x2
2v − 10y213 − 16y113 , v > x2
(Equation 29d)
≤ 10
13
(v − y2) =
∫ v
yi+1
a∗C(t)dt (As v < y1)
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We now prove for even i > 1. The case for odd i is similar. Note that gA(xi) =
xi+1
2 and
gA(yi) =
yi+1
2 for all i > 1. In this case, as the expressions for A and C are the same, it is sufficient
to show that∫ gB(v)
gB(yi+1)
a∗B(t)dt =
{
40
13·2i+2 (v − yi+1) , v ≤ xi+1
40
13·2i+2 (xi+1 − yi+1) + 4013·2i (v − xi+1) , v > xi+1
=
{
10
13·2i (v − yi+1) , v ≤ xi+1
20
13·2i (yi − yi+1) + 4013·2i (v − yi) , v > xi+1
(Equation 29c)
≤ 20
13
(v − yi) =
∫ v
yi+1
a∗C(t)dt (As v < y1)
The moreover part can be observed by putting v = yi in our equations.
Proof of Lemma 10.
Feasibility We verify the feasibility constraints in Equation 21. It is straightforward to verify
that a∗¯
G
are monotone (constraint (21c)) and take values in [0, 1] (constraint (21d)). Finally, the
constraint (21b) holds because of Lemma 15.
Optimality We verify all the constraints in Equation 23. The constraints (23a), (23b) are
straightforward to verify from the definition of a∗G. The constraint (23c) follows from the fact
that λC(v) is 0 throughout and
λA(v) > 0 =⇒ ∃i > 0 : v ∈ (gA(x2i+1), gA(x2i−1)) =⇒ a′∗A(v) = 0
λB(v) > 0 =⇒ ∃i > 0 : v ∈ (gB(x2i+2), gB(x2i)) =⇒ a′∗B(v) = 0
The constraint (23d) holds because γG(v) is 0 throughout. For the constraint (23e), we need to
prove that for all yi ∫ gA(yi)
0
a∗A(x)dx =
∫ gB(yi)
0
a∗B(x)dx =
∫ yi
0
a∗C(x)dx
which holds because of (the moreover part of) Lemma 15
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